
Islamism and Democracy

Political Reform and Social Order in the Muslim World

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Introduction

In 1978-79, a mass movement headed by Ruhollah Khomeini's faction of the Shi'i clergy toppled the corrupt and authoritarian government of the Shah of Iran – a major American client who had for decades resisted any concession to popular participation in his country. As the Iranian Revolution progressed, it became apparent just how brittle the state apparatus had become under the Pahlavis, and how disconnected from society; the Shah and his advisors consistently failed to grasp the extent of popular alienation, and the army was too fragmented and dependent on the monarch to counter the revolutionaries when the Shah proved indecisive.¹ With the Shah seriously ill and no longer confident of American support, his centralized state simply collapsed.

For its part, however, the new clerical government proved scarcely less authoritarian than its predecessor; while it accommodated Iran's constitutional and parliamentary tradition, it vested ultimate power in unelected religious bodies such as the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader. The Republic's revolutionary tribunals, draconian laws of personal conduct, persecution of independent media and scholars, and attempted destabilization of neighboring governments – all in the name of Islam – appalled the West and set a grim precedent for the involvement of Islam in modern politics.² The United States, which had seen an important client replaced with an implacably hostile populist government, became particularly antagonistic to the new Republic and its Khomeinist ideology.

A decade later, in 1988, massive urban riots marked the crisis of another authoritarian state: the single-party regime of the Algerian FLN, whose anti-colonial legitimacy had been depleted by nearly three decades of economic mismanagement and the effective exclusion of the young from political participation.³ The strains of economic reform in the 1980s had split the previously existing monolith of state, military, and single party; when President Chadli Benjedid began a political liberalization process in response to the October 1988 riots, he

faced stiff resistance both from an FLN committed to remaining the party of government and from an army which feared retribution for past repression. As in Iran, the authoritarian Algerian elites underestimated both the dissatisfaction of the populace and their own unpopularity. While Benjedid focused on undermining his rivals in the party and military, the Islamist FIS emerged as the voice of the alienated urban masses and won a strong majority in the municipal elections of 1990.

This development alarmed not only the Algerian but the French government, itself experiencing difficulties in assimilating large numbers of Muslim North African migrants into its resolutely secular political system.⁴ The FIS implemented a number of illiberal policies in the municipalities under its control, and spoke with two voices on the subject of democracy. While leader Abassi Madani generally claimed to accept the need for continuing elections and coexistence with opposition parties, his chief deputy Ali Belhadj and other young firebrands declared that a FIS victory in legislative elections would mean the suspension of the constitution, the banning of all secular and atheist parties, and the application of the *shari'a* as the sole source of law.⁵ Belhadj explicitly rejected democracy, pluralism, a written code of positive legislation, and a party system as utterly inconsistent with Islam – and “these were not isolated, polemical statements,” but deeply rooted convictions of a significant portion of the FIS leadership.⁶ Belhadj and Abassi also responded to military hostility with scarcely veiled threats, proposing the establishment of “popular tribunals” to investigate the army’s brutality in the 1988 riots.⁷

Despite (or perhaps due to) the best electoral manipulations of the regime and hostile attention from both government and French media, the FIS emerged from the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991 miles ahead of any contender, with the possibility of a two-thirds majority in the January run-off – enough to amend the Constitution. At this, the military leadership broke from Chadli, forced his resignation, and cancelled the January

1992 electoral round. France largely supported this coup, and it was met with at best cautious condemnation from other Western governments. The Islamist movement splintered, with most FIS leaders arrested and others (including some previously considered “moderates”) turning to guerrilla war against the regime. The Algerian civil war continues to this day, despite repeated declarations of victory by the government, and has cost over one hundred thousand lives.

These cases illustrate a dilemma facing Western policy-makers, who have three options in dealing with their allies and clients in the Muslim world: to support authoritarianism, with the risk of stasis, meltdown, and/or civil war; to support democracy, with the risk of instability and/or Islamic government; or to remain uninvolved in questions of regime. Either of the former will create a possibility of backlash against Western policies. But the third option is impossible, given Western interests in various regions of the Muslim world. The financial support and close cooperation required with the Pakistani, Indonesian, and Uzbekistani governments in fighting terrorist groups, or the Moroccan and Turkish governments in checking illegal immigration to Europe, or the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments in safeguarding the West’s oil supply, or the Egyptian and Jordanian governments in backing peace with Israel, will be taken by the populations of these countries as support for their regimes. And of course there are the Muslim-majority countries – Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq – in which Western powers have made themselves directly responsible for building a new government. In all these cases, the question is unavoidable: should the West hope for a controlled, static stability, and encourage dictators, or for dynamic stability, and encourage democratic movements?

For the many states in the Muslim world which are seeking to gain legitimacy by experiments in political participation (and the few which aspire to genuine democracy), the question is sharper: should Islamists even be allowed to contest elections? Many of these

groups (like Belhadj of the FIS) explicitly disdain democracy, declaring it a mere means to power; other Islamists seek to institute legal and constitutional changes so sweeping as to essentially unmake the democratic order. Should such Islamist groups be excluded from elections? Can other Islamists with more moderate, democratic rhetoric be trusted to live by that rhetoric if and when they win power? In more general form, the question could be asked in every region of the world: how far should democratizing countries go in seeking to give anti-system parties a stake in the system?

The risk of allowing Islamists to contest elections can be usefully broken down into three types of perceived “Islamic threat”: the threat to continued democracy, the threat to the growth of liberal values in the Muslim world, and the threat to Western foreign policy goals in the region. The three are often conflated, and it should be obvious that they are linked in a number of important ways; but it is important to distinguish them, for reasons that will become apparent below.

Of course, many rulers in the Muslim world exclude Islamists because they perceive another unacceptable risk: the threat of another group (of whatever ideological hue) supplanting them in power. Islamists are scarcely the sole illiberal or counter-democratic force in the politics of the Muslim world (let alone the only one inclined to hamper Western foreign policy). The state and its military and bureaucratic elites remain the principal obstacle to democratization in the majority of Muslim countries. Ethnic parties, populist or nationalist intelligentsias,⁸ corrupt economic elites, and violent criminal or insurgent groups have also hindered the growth of democracy and liberalism; in many countries, these are clearly greater threats than the Islamist groups. Any system recommended for the “safe” incorporation of Islamists into democracy must therefore take into account the implications for other counter-democratic forces – especially the state.

In the following pages, I seek first to show the desirability and possibility of bringing Islamists into a democratic framework. I then address each of the three categories of threat posed by Islamists, suggesting where possible institutional ways to ameliorate those risks. I conclude that the risk is worth taking, and that it is not over-optimistic to pursue a stable, dynamic, and democratic order in the Muslim world.

I. DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

A. The Desirability of Democracy: Participation and Social Order

An argument for allowing Islamists to participate in elections must begin with the question: Why is democratic political reform in the Muslim world desirable, and why should it seek to include forces hostile to liberal democracy? Democracy may be morally preferable to less participatory forms of government, but it is not clear that the good of participation outweighs the potential ill (to both its own citizens and the international community) of an unstable or illiberal elected government. Fareed Zakaria has recently argued that democratization efforts in many developing countries are premature, that until a modern middle class and an articulate civil society develop to challenge the state, elections will tend to reinforce authoritarian states and illiberal social groups.⁹ Similarly, after presenting evidence that democratizing states are particularly susceptible to violent nationalism, Jack Snyder proposes that the “gradual development” of civic institutions – “the rule of law, an impartial bureaucracy, civil rights, and a professional media” – should precede the holding of elections wherever possible.¹⁰ Should Western powers seek to support limited or liberal authoritarianism (an “enlightened” monarch or dictator operating within a constitutional framework, for example) in countries that are not yet ready for participatory government?

It is true that in the West European countries where modern democracy evolved, constitutional politics generally preceded and only slowly developed into the politics of mass participation. This highlights an important feature of democracy: it is a moving target, an

untidy process of constantly defining and pursuing “representative” and “accountable” government, not an endpoint identifiable at the outset. “Even in the smoothest-running political systems, democracy is not all-or-nothing, but enduringly incremental.”¹¹ Many of the virtues of democracy have been realized only partially in even the longest-lived republics. Popular representation is democracy’s *raison d’être*, but mechanisms to represent “the people” are often manipulable by elites and special interests, and at best approximate the “general will.”¹² Participation is limited by apathy, differential access to resources, and misdesigned institutions. Human rights and liberal values have historically been better defended in democracies than under any other system of government, but of course majorities also frequently support illiberal laws and the exclusion of minorities from political participation.

I suggest that the greatest strength of a democracy is neither its representative nature nor its affinity with liberal values – both tenuous, especially in new regimes – but the open-ended, flexible social order it can sustain. By providing rules that legitimate and institutionalize change (most importantly the succession from one set of rulers to another), a democracy can adapt to a great variety of contexts and challenges. It may not be perfectly representative of the people, but it is *responsive* to the people, and can thus absorb the force of passionate political activism, of large groups of people aroused in a cause, better than even the most “inclusionary” of dictatorships. Yet democracy also hampers the triumph of any given group; no ideology or elite can win a victory more permanent than its ability to satisfy a majority of the people over time. The losers in one round have an incentive to keep playing by democratic rules as long as they see a chance of achieving their ends in a later round. A stable democratic social order should thus exclude in advance as few ends as possible, as long as their advocates are willing to advance them by persuasion and electoral competition and accept defeat at the ballot box.

Democracy excludes certain *means* absolutely, however. It is a presupposition of this paper that violence is the least legitimate, stable, and moral means of seeking political change. The transfer of power by force radically undermines the principles of any peaceful, open social order, and the historical record of revolutions is too messy (both in terms of unintended consequences and of costs to the innocent) to justify violence on consequentialist grounds. A persecuted opposition should exhaust all other strategies – public protest, non-cooperation, civil disobedience, sabotage – before resorting to revolution against the state; violence against other groups of citizens is always to be condemned. For its part, while a state can be rightly condemned for its own use of terror or its refusal to open up political space, in most cases it nevertheless retains a presumption of justification in breaking up violent factions and excluding them from politics. The more openings for participation (and thus for peaceful evolution) a state offers, the less justifiable violence becomes.

Beyond the rejection of violence by all parties, democracy requires the basic freedoms necessary to allow broad and meaningful contestation in electoral politics: the right to stand as a candidate, to organize into parties to contest elections, with universal adult suffrage and limited constraints on the freedoms of political expression and the press.¹³ The restriction of liberties beyond these basic procedural ones – through laws, for example, that prohibit alcohol, ban certain types of music, or mandate a restrictive public modesty code – is an offense against liberalism but not against democracy *per se*.

It is a central contention of this paper that democracy is worth pursuing across the Muslim world for its effects on social order and government-opposition dynamics, whether or not it initially fosters liberalism.

Zakaria, Snyder, and like-minded analysts claim that in countries where the people are unready for democracy, both state and foreign actors can prepare them by promoting civic liberal values and institutions that stop short of mass political participation. I argue that

this strategy fails on two points: the obscurity of democratic “readiness,” and the implausibility of authoritarian states as agents of liberalization. No people is entirely ready for democracy until it begins the rocky learning process of actual participation in its own government; that learning process also offers an opening for liberal and constitutional values, as evidenced (quite remarkably) by the people of Iran since 1979. Perhaps there exists a socioeconomic threshold above which democracy becomes likely to succeed, and below that threshold the West should support enlightened despots when they can be found.¹⁴ But at least in the Muslim world, the countries with arguably liberal autocrats or monarchs (such as Tunisia, Malaysia, and Jordan) enjoy levels of per capita income, literacy, women’s education, and other relevant indicators that approximate or surpass such democracies as Turkey, and go well beyond those of India and Indonesia.¹⁵ There is no objective reason to believe that such states are “unready” to begin (or, in most cases, continue) the democratic learning process.

I would moreover argue that even in poorer and less liberal countries, the people of the Muslim world (especially the Middle East) are generally more ready for democracy than they are ready to learn liberalism from the state or the West. Outside the Arab world, Muslim-majority populations have already had extensive electoral experience, which has shaped their expectations of legitimate government; that genie cannot be put back in the bottle. In the Arab Middle East, the people’s profound alienation from both their own states and the First World is in large part a response to the stagnant, tightly controlled politics of the region. Far from encouraging “the rule of law, an impartial bureaucracy, civil rights, and a professional media,” existing Arab states have generally exerted tremendous efforts to prevent the development of any liberal force that might challenge them. They have attempted to control civil society by fragmenting it in corporatist fashion, with close official oversight of state-approved bodies; where they have failed, it has generally been to the

advantage of illiberal Islamic organizations. Institutional experiments such as Egypt's undemocratic parliament, with an electoral facade that has never once threatened the ruling party's monopoly on power, do more to discredit liberal values and democratic habits than to foster them. Hence while I agree with Zakaria and Snyder that it would probably be safer to generate liberalism before democracy, this does not strike me as a realistic prospect in the modern Muslim-majority world.

Throughout this paper I shall draw attention to the specific habits of existing authoritarian states across the Muslim world which worsen the long-term prospects for democracy. By supporting such states while the intensity of opposition to them grows, Western powers buy a few more years of static stability at the price of a diminished chance of future dynamic stability. Electoral competition for power (in which procedures, not outcomes, are strictly and responsibly controlled by the state) is the least bad way to transform the brittle social order in most Muslim (and especially Middle Eastern) countries.

Encouraging democratization is still a risky strategy. Even the most ardent democrat should take seriously Snyder's documentation of the instability, nationalism, and military assertiveness common among new democracies.¹⁶ Arguably, certain specific countries in the Muslim world are too fragile or too vital to risk their destabilization through elections at the present time. In the rest, Western governments should by all means encourage prudent and gradual strategies of change. But the transformation should not be so gradual that people lose interest (when people stop going to the polls, the mobilizational advantage of extremist cadre parties is greatly magnified), and it cannot stop short of a genuinely open politics. Such a strategy for democracy must therefore move beyond the "pact" between elites which many see as the only realistic hope for sparking democracy in the Middle East.¹⁷ Power-sharing agreements which only slightly expand the number of groups with a say in government should be recognized as a halfway house at best. Only when the rules allow all groups the

opportunity to non-violently challenge the government (and all potential majorities the opportunity to take part in government) will the dynamic stability of democracy be attainable.

Many analysts have questioned whether Islamists will really be satisfied with the limited challenge to the state that is possible under democratic rules – especially if their end goals begin to seem unlikely to be realized under such rules. John Waterbury warns that “to gamble, to ensnare the fundamentalists in the democratic process and to wean them gradually off their messianic quest,” may be a highly irresponsible strategy, given the general inflexibility of religious conviction.¹⁸ Are democratizers naive in hoping that the Islamists will forgo their “messianic quest” when offered a peaceful chance at limited power?

The democratic strategy retains considerable value even if it does not result in the Islamists moderating their beliefs. Broadening the scope of political participation may well diminish the ability of extremist parties to win a majority, even if it does not diminish their ideological fervor. For instance, comparative studies of working-class radicalism suggest that in Europe, the lower economic classes were united by their common exclusion from the political system, encouraging the growth of powerful socialist and communist parties, while in America the early institution of adult male suffrage removed the unifying experience of exclusion, allowing the working class to divide along other cleavages.¹⁹ The Islamic movement in most Muslim-majority countries is no less divided than the labor movement in the United States; but it is unified (and receives mass support) where it provides a voice for the masses who have been shut out of politics. This alone would be a reason to advocate participation as an antidote to extremism.

However, there is also historical reason to hope that participation under well-enforced democratic rules will encourage moderation in extremist parties. Here I would turn to another suggestive case from Western history: the growth of anti-democratic ideological parties in Europe during a period of prolonged political and economic crisis. The oft-cited

parallels of fascism and Communism illustrate what one can hope for (and fear) from the incorporation of Islamism into democratic politics.

B. Anti-Democratic Parties and Electoral Politics: The “Democratic Paradox”

Those who would exclude Islamists from democracy are quick to point out that the Nazis came to power on the strength of their showing in Weimar Germany’s 1932 elections. With his party winning a clear plurality over the Socialists, Hitler was in a strong position to demand the chancellorship from President Hindenburg.²⁰ Comparisons are also often drawn with the 1948 Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, in which a popular, elected Communist Party came to dominate the “National Front” government, infiltrated the military and police, and attempted to adjust the electoral rules in its favor before settling for a largely bloodless coup.²¹ In each case, an expressly anti-democratic party was allowed to take part in elections and won, at its height, roughly 38 percent of ballots cast. In both cases, this contributed to the end of democracy by partially democratic means: a classic democratic paradox.

Similarly, Mussolini’s rise to power seems to counter the hypothesis that democratic participation has a moderating effect on extremist groups. In the 1920s, the Italian monarch, the Church, and many secular liberal intellectuals encouraged Fascist participation in government; they considered Bolshevism the greater threat, and believed “that Fascism would grow tamer with time... that tenure of office would breed a sense of responsibility.”²² Instead, once in office Mussolini sought “an ambience of turmoil and intimidation against which he could move to consolidate his power by legal means.”²³ He introduced a strongly majoritarian electoral law, then resorted to unprecedented violence and intimidation in the 1924 elections to ensure that his would be the dominant party. When prominent socialist Giacomo Matteotti was murdered by Fascist thugs, touching off a political crisis, Mussolini responded by silencing press criticism and seizing dictatorial powers. All this “made a

mockery of the contention that Fascism would grow milder with the responsibilities of office,”²⁴ and set a grim precedent for the inclusion of anti-system parties in a democracy.

Some might question whether today’s “religious fundamentalists” are usefully comparable with the European extremist parties of mid-century. In fact, much as they differ in ideological content, Islamism, fascism, and Communism have many striking similarities in social base, organization, and strategy.

Islamists and fascists alike have depended for their primary cadres upon an educated petty bourgeoisie profoundly disillusioned with the failures of the extant political and economic systems – factionalized parliamentary democracy in interwar Europe, repressive secular nationalist governments in much of the contemporary Muslim world. The Nazi party “drew its critical cadres precisely from among bourgeois civil society activists with few ties to mainstream politics.”²⁵ Mussolini won support from lower-middle-class Italians, in particular “teachers, journalists, and other ‘organic intellectuals’ whose surfeit of high school and university diplomas availed nothing against a chronic shortage of appropriate white-collar jobs.”²⁶ The description vividly recalls today’s unemployable Arabophone Algerian intelligentsia or Egyptian hotel clerks with doctoral degrees – that class of “under-employed intellectuals, the category which is in the long term the most dangerous for the stability of a regime,” and which has increasingly gravitated toward Islamism.²⁷ In Pakistan, the Jama’at-i Islami has served as a means of advancement for an educated lower-middle-class otherwise excluded from the country’s patrimonial politics.²⁸

In many countries, the unemployed lower classes (Turkish *gecekond* dwellers, Algerian *hittistes*) have also been a powerful pro-Islamist bloc – in contrast to Germany and Italy, where such support was largely siphoned away from the fascists to strong Communist parties.²⁹ Nonetheless, the majority of Islamist leaders have been decidedly middle-class: professionals, engineers, graduates with non-religious degrees.

Organizationally, the seminal Pakistani Islamist Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi explicitly took Lenin's concepts of "democratic centralist" leadership and the vanguard party as a model for his Jama'at-i Islami.³⁰ The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, henceforth the Ikhwan) under Hasan al-Banna had a leader-centric authority structure, mobilizational youth league, and paramilitary organization familiar from fascism and Leninism (though Sufism was in fact the strongest influence on al-Banna).³¹ The early Islamist parties of Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey grew out of a fascist-tinged nationalist matrix.³² And like the Italian Communists' paramilitary *Partito Armato* or Mussolini's *squadristi*, the Egyptian Ikhwan had an armed Secret Apparatus (*al-jihaz al-khass*) through the 1940s and 1950s, which trained fighters against external enemies (the British in the Suez and the Israelis in Palestine), but also plotted revolution against the Egyptian government.³³

Strategically, all three radical ideologies have tended to imbue politics with ultimate significance and to strive for control of the state. To the extent that they integrate ideas of democracy, these ideological parties have tended to prefer corporatism and periodic plebiscites to the open-ended, competitive election of representatives (in this respect resembling the secular authoritarian governments that Islamists oppose). Islamists and Communists have faced particularly similar debates over strategy: should the group advance its ideological goals through the transformation of the state or of society? If the former, should the transformation be rapid (revolutionary) or gradual (reformist)?

For all these reasons, the checkered history of how fascists and Communists have contested elections is relevant to the contemporary Muslim world. But the lessons of that history should not unduly alarm a strong democrat. Fascism has in fact never come to power through the ballot box alone; Communism has done so only in certain Indian states, San Marino, and Nepal (and in all those cases also yielded power peacefully).³⁴ Extremist takeovers have occurred through democratic institutions when the democracy is sabotaged, or

where democrats lose their nerve; these examples should indeed be cautionary, but suggest that more robust democracy rather than a retreat from democracy is the solution. In no case has electoral success been a sufficient condition for an extremist takeover, and in many cases participation has encouraged moderate tendencies among the ideologues.

For example, the Nazi party's electoral plurality would not have been a stepping-stone to dictatorship but for the previous crippling of the Weimar parliamentary system by Hindenburg and his reactionary allies.³⁵ By 1932, the power to appoint and remove the chancellor no longer rested with the majority party or coalition in the Reichstag, but with the President alone. Hitler did not become Chancellor because his party won a third of the vote, but because Hindenburg eventually decided (after trying several other options) to make him Chancellor. A robust democracy would not place such discretionary power in the head of state; and a head of state committed to the constitution might have waited out the Nazis, who were by late 1932 experiencing internal dissent, a fundraising and membership crisis, and electoral setbacks, appearing "even to sympathetic observers as a disintegrating giant."³⁶ But Hindenburg had already weakened the Weimar constitution to the point where democratic forces had no institutional base from which to resist the Nazis; and Hindenburg chose Hitler.

The situation is even clearer with Mussolini, who rose to power through the attempts of democrats to appease him *despite* his inability to win over voters. In the 1919 election, the Fascists were included on the government list of candidates and given a place in parliament (35 of 535 seats) which their own dismal electoral showing would never have merited. When Mussolini threatened a coup and mobilized his *squadristi* militia for the 1922 March on Rome, there was a failure of nerve at the heights of the parliamentary regime. Martial law was called off before it was tried; Mussolini was granted power to form the government of his choice and voted extraordinary powers by parliament. It should be no surprise that participation in this sort of system did not moderate the Fascists' demands. Democrats do not

hope to transform extremists by simply granting them power, but by allowing them to contest with other groups under well-enforced rules for the assent of a majority of the public.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, external forces played the crucial role. The Communist infiltration of government and military positions had begun under the Soviet occupation, well before elections, and the knowledge that the Red Army was prepared to intervene was fundamental to the success of the 1948 coup.³⁷ All other Communist takeovers even more clearly owed their success to military force than to electoral efforts.

It is thus too simple to take away the lesson that elections are dangerous, offering radical parties an opportunity to seize absolute power from naive liberals. In a functional parliamentary democracy, a 38 percent plurality of the type achieved by the Nazis or Czech Communists would yield at most a minority government vulnerable to no-confidence votes. For that matter, in Turkey the 34 percent plurality victory for the Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party in November 2002 (which due to Turkey's 10 percent vote threshold has actually produced a strong majority government) has not threatened the democratic order. Rather, democracy may be in danger from extremist parties in countries where important state forces do not accept democracy and are acting to sabotage the system for their own ends (as in Weimar Germany, or Algeria), or where the extremists retain privileged state positions from a past authoritarian government (as in Czechoslovakia, or the Sudan), or where the extremists have external military support (as in Eastern Europe after World War II, or with Nasserites in 1950s Jordan). In such situations, elections should be held with great caution, or perhaps delayed if it seems possible to improve their context. And democracy may fail, as in 1920s Italy, through lack of nerve; democrats must have the courage of their convictions and not "pay off" radical parties with a greater share of power than their vote reflects. The overt threat of violence, such as Mussolini's March on Rome, should be grounds for stern penalties, extending to the banning of a party and arrest of its

leaders. Yet despite such possible setbacks, these are arguments in favor of strong democratic organization; they do not argue against full democratization.

The history of Communism also suggests a happier possibility for an anti-democratic party which contests elections: the party may itself absorb (however reluctantly) democratic norms and values. John Waterbury, writing on Islamists in the Middle East, invites comparison with the Stalinist parties of Cold War Western Europe, whose “persistent failure to win outright majorities led [them] not to resort to extralegal means, but to adopt eurocommunism, acknowledging the legitimacy of ‘bourgeois’ democracy and agreeing to play by the rules before and after elections.”³⁸

The Communist Party of Italy (PCI) was the pioneer and exemplar Eurocommunist party, eventually “something of a model for its counterparts in France and Spain.”³⁹ The PCI had its Stalinist hardliners and its paramilitary wing (the *Partito Armato*), and was internally authoritarian (“democratic centralist”). But after the party’s willingness to back Stalin on the invasion of Hungary led to the loss of 200,000 members, its leaders recognized the need to present a moderate face.⁴⁰ (Under similar popular pressure in France, the PCF refused to change its pro-Soviet line and lost control of the left to the Socialists).⁴¹ The Italian Communists accordingly adopted a gradualist strategy of transforming society. Led by a series of intellectuals – Togliatti, Berlinguer, Occhetto – they took their ideology from Gramsci rather than Lenin, and sought to win intellectual and cultural hegemony as a necessary prelude to political power.⁴²

Some commentators on Eurocommunism write with a certain horror of the Gramscian strategy, as if it were an attempt to murder democracy. “The Gramscian goal – fully adopted by the PCI – is the domination of the political culture of Italy, to gut the system from the inside in order to restructure it in keeping with Communist precepts.... The PCI seeks to convince, soothe, and eventually control.”⁴³ But I argue that so long as the party is

willing (however unhappily) to relinquish control when the voters are no longer convinced or soothed, this strategy is entirely democratic. If one seeks to bring utopian ideologues into democracy – and in countries with large Communist or Islamist blocs, their integration is a vital component of social order – the only strategy tolerable for both democrats and ideologues is to allow the ideologues to attempt to convince everyone of their social vision. If they can do so on an ongoing basis (as tested by continuing peaceable elections under the rules of democracy listed above), they have every democratic right to transform the country.

Liberals may take comfort in the fact that such attempts by extremists rarely if ever succeed; more often, as was the case with the PCI, the choice of a gradual, evolutionary strategy leaves the ideologues ever more invested in the existing system. The Italian Communists would in the end accept “a new political culture, one in which politics would be regarded as a limited activity, not an all-embracing secular religion” – a rejection of the totalism that characterizes radical leftists and Islamists alike.⁴⁴ Democratic participation requires but can also inculcate this perception of politics as a *limited* activity.

The PCI became sweepingly popular in the 1970s, and for several years (before being tarnished by a wave of left-wing terrorism) looked likely to win power. In the 1976 parliamentary elections, the Communists took 34.4 percent of the vote, nearly beating the ruling Christian Democrats (DC).⁴⁵ As the prize of government came closer, the PCI strove ever more diligently to prove its moderation. Its leader Enrico Berlinguer famously called for a “historic compromise” – a coalition with the DC – partly out of wariness that a fragile, isolated PCI government might share the fate of Salvadore Allende’s in Chile.⁴⁶ A similar dynamic can be observed in Turkey, where the very real threat of a military coup (combined, it must be emphasized, with an equally real chance to win elections) kept the Islamists of the Virtue and AK parties on their most moderate and conciliatory behavior. The PCI never did win power, and definitively transformed itself into a social democratic party after 1989.⁴⁷

At a time when the French Communists remained a worker-centered cadre party, the PCI became a true mass party, with over two million dues-paying members and a host of ancillary organizations and social services.⁴⁸ This move also has echoes in Turkish politics. The initial Islamist parties of Necmettin Erbakan (the National Order and National Salvation Parties) were niche ideological parties, resembling Alparslan Türkeş' extreme-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) with a religious tinge. With the Refah (Welfare) Party in the early 1990s, however, the Islamists initiated a style of "vernacular politics" and a network of social services which allowed them to mobilize a mass base. This coincided both with astonishing electoral success and increasingly moderate, responsible rhetoric and action.⁴⁹ By contrast, the radical MHP's moments of glory have been acts of political maneuver, coalition-building, and infiltration; only in 1999 did they experience significant electoral success, and in retrospect their vote seems to have been "borrowed" from the Fazilet (Virtue) Party (which reclaimed its voters under the AK banner in 2002).⁵⁰ In a democratic context, the move from an ideological cadre party to a party representing mass interests is generally accompanied by growing moderation. However, like a strategy of gradualism, this shift is only likely in an open political system, where mass mobilization by non-state actors is legal and where gradual, rule-based change to the state is a possibility.

One final parallel between Eurocommunism and Islamism bears mention: by the 1970s, American opposition to Communist participation in government was only partly based on the concern that such parties would overturn democracy in Western Europe. Rather, the US government feared that Eurocommunist governments might take their countries out of NATO, or hew to a foreign policy more in line with Soviet than Western interests. As in the Muslim world today, national interest was often cloaked behind appeals to democracy and/or liberalism. This common subterfuge will be further discussed below.

C. The Possibility of Islamic Democracy

We turn now to the analysis of Islamism itself. Islamists are defined here as individuals and groups that actively seek to bring the political and social life of their nation into perfect accord with the sacred laws and norms of *shari'a* – whether abruptly or gradually, whether by social reform, political contestation, or the revolutionary takeover of the state. The end, not the means, defines Islamism. One can imagine a purely evolutionary Islamist who sees no active role for the state in purifying Muslim society, or a democratic Islamist who believes that the best means to institutionalize *shari'a* is to peacefully convince a majority of citizens to assent to it over repeated elections. However, the great majority of Islamists quite unsurprisingly see the state as the natural instrument to institute and execute *shari'a* law; and to judge by their texts, most Islamists also perceive their goal to be in tension if not conflict with various principles of “Western” liberal democracy, including *inter alia* popular sovereignty, separation of powers, the mutability of laws and governments, multi-party contestation for power, equal rights for women and non-Muslims, and the rights to apostasize and proselytize for non-Islamic ideas.

A number of seminal Islamist thinkers have asserted that Islam can only exist as *din wa dawla* (religion and state) without any differentiation, mirroring the perfect unity (*tawhid*) of God. The content of the law has been handed down by the deity, who alone is sovereign; the executive and the judicial powers are to be judged according to standards derived from *shari'a*, not judged by whatever standard is preferred by a majority. Were such Islamists correct, then Islam would certainly be incompatible with democracy.

Yet this Islamist model is plainly grounded in ideology, not in Muslim history. The doctrine of *tawhid* notwithstanding, a separation of roles and an irreducible diversity of opinion are well-established features of Muslim religious and political life. The consolidation and subsequent decline of the early Arab empires – in which the religio-

political institution of the caliphate gradually lost power and legitimacy until its destruction by the Mongols – led to an institutional differentiation between political and religious leadership which became the norm throughout the Muslim world. Religious authority passed into the hands of a class of scholars (known as *'ulama*, “the learned,” or *fuqaha*, “jurisprudents”) whose legitimacy “rested largely on their semi-independence from a decentralized political system, and their dual function of representing the interests of the state to the laity and the interests of the laity to the state.”⁵¹ Numerous texts warn the *'ulama* against corruption by the political powers. Much popular religion was also located in the Sufi *tarikats* or brotherhoods, which were even freer from state control, and periodically became a locus for peasant or tribal rebellions and (later) anti-colonial uprisings.

Nor did the Sunni *'ulama* promote a single, unambiguous, divinely mandated law; they were divided into four loosely organized, divergent, but equally orthodox schools of *shari'a* interpretation. Their jurisprudence moreover varied from region to region, often adapting to tribal or pre-Islamic custom. This allowed for diversity of opinion among Muslims (within certain limits) while simultaneously keeping the *'ulama* divided by territory and legal school. Even in Iran, where Shi'ism was the established sect and rather more institutionalized, the dominant ayatollahs until Khomeini were resolutely apolitical, believing that bar a crisis situation, involvement in politics was beneath their dignity. Clerical rule was an innovation of Khomeini, sustained by his personal charisma, and has been in a state of ever-deepening crisis since his death.

Hence, since the 10th-century decline of the Abbasid caliphate, Islam has provided its followers with a shared language but not a common political *or* religious authority structure. This diminishes the likelihood of wholesale change in the Muslim world. Unlike Catholicism (where a central authority could effectively mandate acceptance of modernity and democracy, leading to a wave of democratization in majority-Catholic countries from the

1970s on), or Communism (where the collapse of a central hegemon definitively discredited a particular mode of ideological politics), and notwithstanding the sporadic efforts of Iran or Saudi Arabia to purchase hegemony for their peculiar interpretations of religion and politics, Islam remains decentralized and non-hierarchical. Any change will have to spread country by country over time – much as ideas of democracy and capitalism spread throughout Western Europe, by experimentation, borrowing, and active interference between neighbors.

There is a long way to go. Islam is clearly compatible with pluralism, but that does not necessarily mean that Islam lends itself to democratization. Even a cursory review of politics over the last century would reveal that the Muslim world (and in particular the Middle East) has sustained fewer democracies than any comparable region. A recent statistical analysis by M. Steven Fish suggests that there is a negative correlation between Islam and democracy that persists even when controlling for certain obvious factors (e.g. low per capita GDP, slow economic growth, high ethnolinguistic diversity).⁵²

Is strict state secularism perhaps a solution? One is tempted to propose *laik* Turkey as a model: it is at once the most secular Muslim state and the one with (arguably) the most functional democracy and most moderate Islamists. On the other hand, the next most moderate Islamists are in Jordan and Morocco, both states with conservative, religiously legitimated monarchs; while aggressively secularizing leaders in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and above all Pahlavi Iran have directly provoked a militant Islamist response.⁵³ Islam is a religion with strong public implications; the attempt to exclude religion from matters of law and politics in the Muslim world is almost everywhere impracticable. Secular institutions took root in Turkey against the odds, thanks in part to the personal charisma of Atatürk and in greater part to utter exhaustion and social disarray in Anatolia after the long, violent death of the Ottoman Empire – not conditions one can expect (or should hope) to see replicated elsewhere.⁵⁴

In a normal democratic context, Islam and politics could inform each other without excluding all other religions from politics or giving absolute power to one interpretation of sacred law. The basic modern differentiation between religious and political spheres does not require a purge of religion from public life – many European countries continue to support state churches, and Christian clergy do not hesitate to advocate political positions on abortion, social welfare policies, or war in Iraq.⁵⁵ Nor is strict secularism generally required for healthy democracy. Fish points out that most of the countries which maintained a “free” Freedom House score for the last decade despite having a per capita GDP below \$6,000 – the overachievers of the democratic world – are far from secular, including hotbeds of religiosity such as Benin, Costa Rica, Namibia, and Poland.⁵⁶

Claims that Islam is inherently anti-modern or anti-democratic echo those made for other religions in the past. Catholic Christianity experienced a similarly tumultuous adjustment to modernity, from which the French term *intégriste* (today applied to Muslim fundamentalists) drew its original reference. Catholic democracies, like impoverished democracies, were long considered exceptions to the general rule. Yet Catholicism is now the primary confirmation for José Casanova’s claim that “there are public religions in the modern world which do not need to endanger either modern individual freedoms or modern differentiated structures,” and statistical analyses suggest that democracy is actually *more* likely in Catholic countries.⁵⁷ Is Islam likely in the foreseeable future to be such a religion – to inspire its adherents to non-violently engage in public activity and debate while respecting freedom of conscience and eschewing theocracy? Could there be Islamic Democrats along the lines of Europe’s Christian Democratic parties?

Islam certainly can be understood and practiced in ways that reinforce democracy. A number of Muslim scholars have put forth theological articulations of Islam (readings of the Qur’an, interpretations of *shari’a*) which entail a modern, tolerant, public role.⁵⁸ Largely

independent of such abstract theologies, a number of self-avowedly Islamic parties and politicians have been feeling their way toward a praxis of Islam and democracy. Some have failed; the Khatami movement in Iran seems to have stalled, and promising Arab efforts such as Egypt's Wasat Party were prematurely shot down.⁵⁹ But Turkey's succession of Islamist parties have moved in a strongly positive direction, and despite bloody Christian-Muslim combat in parts of Indonesia, the archipelago's two giant religious parties (Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) are expressly pluralist and non-theocratic.⁶⁰ And one should not over-idealize the Christian Democratic model; like the Italian DC, the mildly Islamic Muslim League party of former Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif is better known for corruption and scheming to retain power than for religious fervor, yet it remains committed to elections and has consistently outpolled the radical Islamists.

These real-life examples do not, in my opinion, support the suggestion (advanced by John Voll and John Esposito) that Islamists, led by the ideal of *tawhid* and the duty of *shura* (consultation), may arrive at a "consensual" or "unitary" form of democracy distinct from the adversarial Western model.⁶¹ No two democracies look alike, and democracies in the Muslim world will doubtless have their own distinctive features; but the denial of multiparty competition has everywhere crippled democracy. Like non-market means of determining a fair price, non-competitive means of determining the will of the people are highly contestable and prone to distortion. The only way to confirm a consensus is to open it up to all potential challengers. To do that, however, one must admit the existence of challengers – that is, the existence of a multiplicity of interests in society, which is axiomatic for the model of democracy advanced above, but is denied by too many Islamists. For example, moderate Tunisian Islamist Rashid al-Ghannushi has condemned Western pressure for human rights as a strategy to "produce fissures" in the unity of the *umma* by encouraging minorities to define their interests against those of the state.⁶²

There are also serious problems with the common Islamist rejection of popular sovereignty. It is possible to envision democracy without a theory of popular sovereignty; one could believe that God was the sovereign source of the law, yet hold on epistemological grounds that the details of the divine law were not knowable with certainty (or that the application of its general principles was historically contingent), and that positive laws thus needed to be hashed out by a majority of the people. *Shari'a* can thus be declared a constitutional principle without determining an entire body of immutable law in advance (a possibility discussed further below). But Islamists like Belhadj, Khomeini, and Mawdudi hold that the divine law can be understood with sufficient certainty (by all devout Muslims, or by religious experts) that most issues should never be put to a popular vote. Like revolution, *shari'a* can only advance; one cannot allow an unrighteous majority to undo progress already made.

All this is not to say that Islamists cannot be genuine democrats; the AK party may well be the most democratic party in Turkey today. But the Turkish Islamists' embrace of democratic norms has not happened through the articulation of some new form of consultative, non-adversarial democracy. It happened through long years of practical experience in electoral and parliamentary processes borrowed from the West. The Indonesian Muslim parties are likewise happy to work within a competitive parliamentary framework; the Egyptian Ikhwan declared in 1995 that multi-party politics is consistent with the *shari'a* ideal of *shura* or consultation; and Muhammad Khatami won the Iranian presidency through an energetic, image-oriented campaign widely compared to Bill Clinton's. By contrast, the expounders of a distinctively Islamic set of democratic institutions and practices have either not had the chance to put their theories into action (Ghannushi, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi) or, as in the case of Sudan's Hasan al-Turabi, have spectacularly forfeited their democratic credentials.⁶³

The balance of power between democratic and undemocratic forces in Catholicism was tipped at the Second Vatican Council. Since no such center of authority exists in Islam, under what circumstances could one envision a widespread shift away from the Islamism of Turabi and Khomeini to the Islamism of Erdoğan and Khatami? Though the record is ambiguous, I would argue that (perhaps unsurprisingly) democratic articulations of Islam are more likely to develop in regimes that hold meaningful elections. Ideas such as *tawhid*, *shura*, *ijma'* (consensus), and *ijtihad* (independent judgment on *shari'a* matters) do not themselves generate democracy; but when believers are placed in an electoral framework, they often begin to interpret those ideas in a democratic manner. A general shift toward democratic institutions is thus likely to empower a more moderate and pluralist Islam, while radical Islamists can persist under any form of government.

This argument reverses the typical causal connection inferred between theocratic Islam and authoritarianism in the Muslim world. If authoritarian state structures rather than cultural factors explain the democratic gap in the Muslim world, how to account for the prevalence of those state structures? I suggest that the Arab Middle East, with a high number of states relative to a low population, is overrepresented in both most statistical analyses of the Muslim world; and the Arab world is persistently undemocratic not because of Islam, but because of a geographical coincidence that has allowed the development of the highest concentration of rentier and semi-rentier states in the world.⁶⁴ Economies dominated by oil exports (and to a lesser extent by other commodity monocultures, such as Moroccan phosphates or Egyptian cotton)⁶⁵ allow the state to control the country's main source of income generation (foreign rents), to generously support its repressive apparatus (the *mukhabarat* or secret police state), and in general to fund itself without accountability to its citizens.⁶⁶ Massive subsidies from foreign states, such as those currently provided to the Egyptian and Jordanian governments by the United States, have a similar effect.

The autonomy of the foreign-funded state from its people is the single most significant political fact about the Middle East.⁶⁷ With similar rentier dictatorships in much of post-Soviet Central Asia, Indonesia, and Nigeria, and recurring war combined with dire poverty in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and sub-Saharan Africa, the disproportionate success of authoritarianism in the Muslim world does not require an Islamic explanation.

D. The State and Islamists: Repression and Cooptation

Elections do not automatically produce democratic Islamists, nor is it impossible for civil pluralist Islam to develop under an authoritarian regime. In Kuwait, the ruling family has allowed an elected partyless assembly with limited powers and suffrage (only adult Kuwaiti males vote, in a state where over half the population are foreign resident laborers). Islamists have repeatedly won the largest bloc in the assembly, and in some ways have acted to expand the narrow ambit of Kuwaiti democracy, criticizing corruption and ineptitude in government. But in one crucial aspect, they have stalled democratic progress: the amir has repeatedly offered to extend suffrage to women, and the Islamist assembly has narrowly voted against allowing women to vote.⁶⁸ In Indonesia, by contrast, the transformation of the conservative Nahdlatul Ulama into a pro-democracy organization took place in the most illiberal phase of the Suharto dictatorship, without the benefit of participation in democratic institutions. Both these cases (and others: Algeria on the one hand, Tunisia on the other) make it impossible to posit too strong a connection between elections and the marginalization of radical Islamic groups or growth of moderate ones.

However, the majority of cases show a clear trend: popular Islamist groupings in Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, and Tajikistan have changed their structures and moderated their demands in response to perceived opportunities to take part in government at some level through elections. As with the PCI in post-war Italy, involvement in parliamentary politics has led the Egyptian Ikhwan to adopt a Gramscian strategy:

The MB [Ikhwan] has not managed to pass any legislation in full accord with its Islamic ideology, but it has managed on several occasions to influence public policies through the parliamentary platform it enjoys. . . . While continuing the Islamic quest, the MB has made clear that it seeks its objectives via a gradualist approach, that is, the MB does not expect to turn Egypt into an Islamic state over night, not even if they secured a majority in parliament.⁶⁹

Here again, I argue that if one waits for liberalism before initiating democracy, one is likely to end up with neither. Democracy and liberalism are largely learned behaviors; Western states should encourage the creation of country-specific institutional frameworks which allow that learning to begin.

A more hardheaded argument could be offered against this proposal, however. Violence or the threat of violence, whether state repression or civil war, also played a significant part in all the instances of Islamist moderation listed above. Perhaps the Islamists changed their tune not because of a partial opening of the political system, but out of simple fear. Perhaps this merely confirms the dictum of Martin Kramer that “all the evidence is that power does not ‘moderate.’ Weakness ‘moderates.’”⁷⁰ Kramer has argued in several forums that strong states are the answer to the Islamist problem – able to coopt Islamists where cooptation is possible and repress them where it is not. He suggests that in many cases, Western pressure for democracy and human rights are counterproductive, weakening the ability of Muslim states to resist extremists.

But the claim that “weakness moderates” extremists surely overstates the case. Brutal repression has enabled several governments to quell Islamist opposition; as Kramer says, the local autocrats learned from the collapse of the Shah. But weakness has not *moderated* the Islamists in most of these countries or provided a lasting respite from religious radicalism. As Michael Hudson points out, only in Syria and Iraq has state violence clearly succeeded in cowing Islamists over the long term.⁷¹ In Egypt under Nasser and Sadat, in Algeria after the 1992 coup, and in Palestine over the last decade, repression has led to a

cycle of instability and violence. In this common scenario, the secular regime survives but the Islamist threat is deferred, not defeated, and at a terrible human cost.

Moreover, the states Kramer takes as models of strength are feeble in several important ways. Nazih Ayubi points out that the Arab state's autonomy from its people makes it strong, but its alienation from its people makes it weak.⁷² Its infrastructural powers – taxation, administration of justice, law enforcement – are poorly developed, which makes it ill-fitted to address the widespread problems of unemployment, corruption, and economic stagnation. As a result, its legitimacy is perpetually under challenge – a challenge it can only meet through repression or buying off the opposition.⁷³ And the rentier state is not totally autonomous; it has merely traded its local constituency for a wealthier and less demanding foreign constituency. (Hence the assiduous attempts of Saudi Arabia and Pahlavi Iran to stay on America's good side).

The states' economic policies have been a source of political crisis. Rentier states are vulnerable to inflation and drops in commodity prices, as Iran in the late 1970s and Algeria in the 1980s demonstrated. Import substitution industrialization, widely practiced at mid-century, failed as stunted domestic markets proved too small to support national industries.⁷⁴ In the late 1970s and 1980s, three Middle Eastern governments launched major reform programs to internationalize and modernize their economies: Sadat's *infitah* in Egypt and the roughly contemporaneous liberalizations of Chadli Benjedid in Algeria and Turgut Özal in Turkey. But with these reforms, a conspicuously consuming *arriviste* class emerged at the top of the new private economy, even while other sectors of society lost the state employment and social welfare nets that had kept them afloat. A seething populist reaction with strong religious overtones emerged, directed at the perceived corruption that led to such an unequal distribution of the nation's wealth. In democratic Turkey, the reaction was absorbed more or

less peacefully into party politics; in Egypt and (far more) in Algeria, it has been a continuing source not only of discontent but of violence.

Another source of state weakness in the Muslim world is the demographic boom of the last few decades, producing far too many young people for the states to absorb into either their stagnant economies or their sclerotic political structures. In Algeria, FLN membership was long limited to the revolutionary generation, and constant surveillance of party members deterred involvement by youth.⁷⁵ In Egypt, the professional syndicates and political parties faced generational crises by the 1990s, as educated, underemployed young men accused the old guard of excluding them from the leadership and its benefits. Islamists were often the beneficiaries of this discontent. The anomic urban youth of Algeria supported both the FIS and (once the war was underway) the brutal GIA in mass numbers. In Egypt, the young professionals were the backbone of the Ikhwan's successful efforts to win syndicate elections; ironically, young Ikhwan activists then took their newfound experience forming political networks and challenged the Muslim Brotherhood's own gerontocracy.⁷⁶ Demographer Philippe Fargues claims that in most Middle Eastern countries, fertility is starting to decline; but it will still be decades before the current destabilizing youth bulge works its way through the population.⁷⁷

Still, Kramer has with some justice accused Western academics of exaggerating the fragility of Middle Eastern states. After all, barring Lebanon and now Iraq, all the regimes in the Arab world have endured for decades, notwithstanding bread riots, local insurgencies, and general discontent. "Weak" states with low levels of legitimacy can persist for a long time if their population is thoroughly depoliticized. Juan Linz's description of the late Franco regime in Spain might well apply to the Muslim world:

The observer who notes the widespread and often bitter opposition, even at the highest levels, will be right in a sense, but he will also be quite wrong in his

perception. Despite the ‘opposition’ of so many people and predictions of its impending doom since the end of World War II, the regime remains stable.

Yet one piece of Linz’s picture does not fit quite as well in today’s Middle East:

Widespread ‘opposition’ has not endangered it in recent years nor have massive force or terror been required to sustain it.⁷⁸

Throughout the Middle East, massive force has periodically been required to sustain many states – one thinks of the 1982 Hama massacre in Syria, Saddam Hussein’s purges among the Shi’i, the repeated campaigns by the Egyptian government to wipe out radical Islam, or the Algerian civil war. Islamism was the politicizing factor in all the above cases, posing recurring challenges to a delegitimized state.⁷⁹ In many cases, the Islamists themselves have merely capitalized on an outbreak of mass hostility to the state; neither the Khomeinists nor the FIS directly inspired the riots that shook the regimes of the Shah and the FLN. Rather, they provided a voice and a purpose for inarticulate mass discontent, and had the organizational potential to muster those masses for action.

In a bureaucratic-authoritarian context where bursts of state repression and cooptation have discouraged political mobilization, Islam will continue to be a political rallying point. Like Communist parties, Islamists “have traditionally been able to cope with the rigors of illegality much better than have other political groups.”⁸⁰ Universities, civil associations and newspapers (the loci of secular political mobilization) are all within the state’s reach, but its ability to regulate mosques is more limited; in small countries such as Jordan, it may succeed in registering and monitoring them all, but in the larger states of the region (Egypt, Algeria, Turkey) a network of independent mosques has sprung up beyond state control or surveillance, connected to the Islamists’ generally successful social service programs. And even in Jordan, the state has been unable to staff all the mosques; it has had to bring in independent preachers who do not necessarily share the convictions of the regime.⁸¹

One all-too-common response of authoritarian governments in this sort of legitimacy crisis is to try to outflank the Islamists by bringing more religion into public life or even implementing *shari'a* themselves. This is the worst of all possible worlds from either a democratic or liberal view: a specific, usually highly conservative interpretation of Islam becomes state policy, without the accountability and reversibility that democracy provides. Yet analysts who oppose elections for fear of an Islamist victory typically ignore the possibility that existing dictators or monarchs will also try to capitalize on Islam.

Such analysts seem to be operating with the Islamist threat to foreign policy as their primary concern; Islamizing autocrats are perceived as being more likely than elected radical parties to adhere to a Western policy line (anti-Communist, pro-Israel). But the autocrats' actions can weaken or reverse whatever tendencies toward moderation might have existed in the Islamist parties – a much more damaging phenomenon in the long run. And recent events have cast grave doubt on the foreign policy wisdom of backing friendly Islamizing tyrants.

In the Sudan in the late 1970s, the decaying dictatorship of Ja'far al-Nimeiri was threatened by continuing popular support for the two dominant, non-Islamist religious parties (the Umma and the DUP, based in Sufi brotherhoods).⁸² Nimeiri accordingly favored the radical Islamists of the NIF, an Ikhwan offshoot headed by Hasan al-Turabi. Turabi was made attorney general, and a new penal code based on *shari'a* was established, reigniting the civil war with the non-Muslim south. During this period, the long-standing Islamist effort to infiltrate the armed forces began to bear fruit.⁸³ Nimeiri fell in 1985, and the ensuing elections returned the conservative Umma party to government; the NIF won the most votes among students and the urban poor, but overall achieved less than a third of the combined Umma-DUP vote.⁸⁴ At first, the NIF sought to pull the Umma Party toward Islamism; but when the government looked likely to sign a peace accord ending the war with the south, an Islamist cell in the military staged a coup with Turabi's support. The Islamist state in Sudan

exists not because the NIF was allowed to contest the 1986 elections, but because it had previously benefited from seven years of access to state support and the military under an Islamizing dictator.

In Pakistan, the imposition of *shari'a* was led by the military dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq (though the first hints did emerge under the elected Bhutto government). The Jama'at-i Islami, which had never won enough votes to enter a governing coalition, was willingly coopted into the regime.⁸⁵ As in Sudan, the Islamization of the Pakistani armed forces and security services dates to this dictatorship, when Islamist elements in the military played a major role in the creation of *jehadi* militias in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In Indonesia, the Suharto dictatorship initially made use of the Nahdlatul Ulama to purge the Communist Party, then locked the NU out of power.⁸⁶ In the dying years of his regime, Suharto tried once again to appeal to Islam; but with a moderate, chastened NU now resisting his blandishments, he turned instead to more radical and violent groups, setting their militias against religious minorities and the mainstream Muslim parties. All three of the above dictators were backed by the United States for their anti-Communist stance. In all three cases, the radical Islamist tendencies they encouraged spread out of control, and the ensuing violence has impacted not only the Muslim world but the United States as well.

On a less dramatic level, Egypt's Husni Mubarak has tried to counter the Ikhwan's accusations of *jahiliyya* (barbarity, un-Islamic behavior) by introducing "increasing doses of religion into legislation, education, the media and elsewhere" – a strategy which "may well be encouraging the militants, as they interpret the government's actions as revealing its weakness, consequently to increase their pressure for yet more concessions."⁸⁷ In such cases, the Islamists achieve their goals without having to be publicly accountable for the results – a theme explored further below.

E. The State and Islamists: Partial Liberalization and Elections

In the search for legitimacy, many authoritarian regimes throughout the Muslim world have also adopted strategies of partial political liberalization, setting up elected legislatures or advisory councils. Such institutions have provided some space for debate, a public platform for opposition views, and a degree of political mobilization outside the state. Still, for the most part these experiments are tightly controlled and far from democratic:

The powers of the judicial and legislative branches are sharply constrained, opposition parties have only limited access to media and are usually restricted in their campaigning activities, new political parties must receive governmental permission to become legal, votes in support of the ruling party are often coerced, and various means of falsifying the actual vote count (*tazwir*) obtain. None of these elections have changed governments, or even altered unpopular policies. These are elections that do not disturb their authoritarian milieu.⁸⁸

Some states allow more disturbance than others. Ghassan Salamé has suggested that small countries like Kuwait, Jordan, and Lebanon are likely to come closer to thorough-going democracy because their leaders, “incomplete hegemons [trying] to defend the states created for them,” have had no choice but to allow genuine power-sharing.⁸⁹ By adopting electoral institutions, they distinguish themselves from their large, threatening neighbors. A similar argument has been applied to Arab monarchies defending themselves against the ideologies of hostile neighboring republics (Jordan and Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, Kuwait and Iraq; and Saudi Arabia, though a monarchy, similarly threatens the Jordanian, Kuwaiti, and Qatari monarchies by the promulgation of Wahhabi ideology).⁹⁰ There are limits, however, to what even the more liberal monarchies will allow. Jordan accepted the outcome of the 1989 elections, with its Islamist-dominated parliament – a result scarcely thinkable in Egypt or (tragically) Algeria. But when Layth al-Shubaylat (independent Islamist MP and popular firebrand) opened parliamentary hearings on corruption and failed by one vote to indict a former prime minister, the Jordanian regime trumped up sedition charges against Shubaylat as “a clear signal to the Islamists that not everything that was legal would be tolerated.”⁹¹

The move toward elections has generally encouraged Islamists to moderate themselves, even though the degree of power they have been allowed to win has varied greatly. Controlled-outcome elections, however, are not a desirable policy over the long term. Various features of the authoritarian strategy of partial liberalization actually benefit radicals, encumber liberals, and keep Islamists from the accountability and self-examination that might lead to thoroughgoing moderation.

First, in order to keep parties from accumulating too much popularity, many semi-authoritarian states maintain a strict line between civil society and political parties (legally curtailing the parties' ability to run social services, women's organizations, foundations like Germany's *Stiftungen*, etc.). For example, women's associations in Jordan are not allowed to talk about electoral strategies to advance their cause; and cultural organizations are cancelled if they express ideas critical of government. This tactic is counterproductive; it strengthens Islamist candidates (who retain an informal connection with social service organizations even when formal connections have been banned), and prevents the development of a stable party system by encouraging independent candidacies and tribalism.⁹² In Jordan, "even strong party candidates, such as IAF leaders, still had to rely heavily on tribal support."

Second: manipulations of electoral law are an almost universal feature of these liberalizations, as the government attempts to control the vote result without descending to actual ballot-rigging. Sometimes these electoral manipulations are complete disasters. After the FIS' victory in Algeria's local elections, President Chadli passed a March 1991 electoral law which inflated the Berber vote and packed seats into the sparsely populated southern districts which had tended to vote for the FLN: "a classic example of gerrymandering to achieve rural overrepresentation."⁹³ The new elections law also established a two-party instead of a three-party run-off in districts where no party received 50 percent of the vote. Government-sponsored opinion polls suggested that these provisions would send the bulk of

smaller-party votes to the FLN, allowing the former single party to win most of the seats in which the FIS did not gain an outright majority.⁹⁴ Trusting (not unreasonably) that his manipulations would guarantee success, Chadli retained the first-past-the-post ballot to magnify the FLN victory.

In the event, the FIS won 44 percent of the seats outright, and was ahead in the runoff in another 33 percent of the seats. Thanks to the first-past-the-post rule, despite winning only 49.8 percent of actual votes cast, the Islamists were in line to win a super-majority in the National Assembly – enough to amend the constitution at will. The FLN won less than 4 percent of Assembly seats.⁹⁵ Chadli, though stunned, was willing to cohabit with the Islamists (having amended the constitution to increase his powers as president over the National Assembly), but the military intervened first.

In Jordan, too, the first round of elections in 1989 resulted in a stronger-than-expected Islamist showing: the Ikhwan won the largest single bloc in the parliament, 22 of 80 seats, and were backed up by 11 independent Islamists. King Hussein allowed this result to stand, placed some Islamists in the cabinet during the Gulf War, and planned to weaken the Islamists by a change in electoral law the next time around.⁹⁶ In 1993 the king adopted a first-past-the-post rule, giving all citizens a choice between candidates rather than the right to pick a list of candidates. In tribal Jordan, this resulted in voters choosing based on local or tribal rather than ideological considerations, and the Islamist vote dropped precipitously. The Ikhwan protested and boycotted the 1997 elections, but eventually returned to the fold.

However, even such relatively successful electoral manipulations have the effect of discrediting democracy by revealing its limits. The habits of participation are not developing in Jordan; actual affiliation with a political party is rare and declining (less than 1 percent of the population by 1998) and awareness of political parties' names and platforms remains low (the Islamist IAFP was known or recognized by 57.7 percent of the population; the National

Constitutional and Communist Parties by 34-36 percent; and all other parties by a third or less of the population).⁹⁷ Controlled elections not only damage the potential for healthy democracy, but hinder the moderate parties who might counter radical Islamism. In contemporary Morocco, where the King selects crucial cabinet ministers generally without reference to election results, “the ‘democratic’ political parties have been totally discredited by decades of fruitless opposition, and participation in the corrupt and tightly controlled electoral game.”⁹⁸ In Algeria, the careful rigging of the 1997 assembly elections to reward Mahfoud Nahnah’s moderate Islamist MSP with the largest non-government bloc of seats damaged not only the integrity of the democratic process but Nahnah’s own credibility.⁹⁹

Why do even unfree and unfair elections elicit participation and some moderation from Islamists? In part, because even limited access to the state helps them protect and expand their network of schools and social services; the post of Education Minister can be more valuable than that of Prime Minister.¹⁰⁰ In part, because even without winning power (and the often messy accountability and responsibility that go along with it), winning votes can be a highly effective way to demonstrate the Islamists’ legitimacy and popular support.

In Egypt, for example, elections are routinely skewed, gerrymandered, and outright fabricated to guarantee a ruling-party victory (though a remarkably independent judiciary has repeatedly stricken down unfair electoral laws).¹⁰¹ The discrepancy between official participation rates and those estimated by independent observers is vast: in the referendum of October 1993 confirming Husni Mubarak’s third term as President, the government reported an 84 percent turnout, while Reuters guessed it was less than 5 percent.¹⁰² Parties that the government dislikes are banned or obliged to enter parliament by the back door; the Ikhwan cannot run under its own name, but must tacitly partner with another, legal party.

This policy has backfired; with such a convenient smokescreen, the Brothers “were the only forces whose credibility was not tested from a practical point of view. While the

images of all other political groups were tarnished, the Islamists presented themselves as ‘clean’ and ‘untarnished’ by the political corruption that tainted the other political forces.”¹⁰³

Their popularity continued to grow apace, without obliging them to leave the realm of sloganeering. As Juan Linz said of the leftist opposition in Franco’s Spain,

the remoteness from the moment of taking power, together with the intellectual or ideological character of the leaders, allows them to face key issues with broad statements – some would call them platitudes – that provide little or no insight into the solutions they would advocate to central political, economic, and social problems.¹⁰⁴

Neither in Egypt nor in Jordan were elections allowed to threaten the ruling party’s monopoly on power. However, in Jordan, elected Islamist parliamentarians were allowed significant influence over policy. And they found that the use of political power was not as straightforward as it had seemed from outside:

The Brothers were not ready for pragmatic political bickerings. Some of the issues they raised in parliament were considered petty, insignificant, and unrealistic. Their representative in the parliament became the subject of ridicule by his rivals when he suggested that fathers should not be allowed to attend their daughters’ functions in school because the mixing of the sexes was prohibited in Islam, or that the government should implement measures to stop the distribution, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages.¹⁰⁵

Their success was limited, and some of the laws they succeeded in passing (such as an adjustment to women’s inheritance law) aroused popular anger and resentment. Like the Refah Party in Turkey after its first wave of electoral victory, the Jordanian Ikhwan found itself retracting various policies in the face of public opposition. Realizing that its reputation might be tarnished, the Ikhwan took the striking step of creating an independent party, the IAFP, in order to avoid excessive entanglement in the fortunes of its political wing (and the transparency of accounts required by law of all political parties). This separation of religious and political functions is remarkable in a group which claims the ideological

legacy of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. The IAFP has since become much more internally democratic and open to female participation than the Ikhwan.¹⁰⁶

This contrasts strongly with Mubarak's steps to introduce religion into legislation and state media; in Egypt, the Islamists could play the righteous opposition without being accountable for the religion-based laws they advocate. Unlike post-1989 Jordan, where King Hussein allowed the Islamists to take the initiative – and, thus, the responsibility for the inevitable complications of fusing elements of *shari'a* to a modern state system – the Egyptian government's tentative embrace of religion has boosted the legitimacy of political Islam without inducing any realism in its Islamists. In the Egyptian model of cooptation, the Islamists still compete primarily with the government; in Jordan, the locus of competition shifted to rivalry with other parties, and debate within the Islamist movement itself.

Without real participation in government, the Islamists will never be allowed to fail. Islam is *not* the solution to most of the problems of the Muslim world, any more than it is their cause. Islamists may be able to run social services more efficiently and professional syndicates more honestly than other political forces (though their record there has been contested).¹⁰⁷ But few Islamists have realistically confronted the broader dilemmas of economic and political stagnation that afflict their nations. When they do, it is difficult to decide which solution is properly Islamic, as shown by the shambolic state of debate in the Iranian parliament (for example, is it more Islamic to help the dispossessed or to defend private property?).¹⁰⁸ Almost always, the parties that go beyond sloganeering are those which have real experience of participation; the Iranian reformists under Khatami, for example, or the Turkish Islamists, whose campaigns at their best have been said to combine “a humanistic, inclusionary, almost social-democratic tone with a concrete, issue-based understanding of politics.”¹⁰⁹

Fareed Zakaria recognizes that “wherever Muslim fundamentalists have been involved in day-to-day politics – Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran – their luster has worn off. They routinely poll well below traditional parties.... If countries do more to include the fundamentalists in the system, they will stop being seen as distant heroes and will be viewed instead as local politicians.”¹¹⁰ He thus advises opening up “*some* political space” such that Islamists have a chance to be discredited. However, he continues to hope that this can be done without elections. I propose instead that with a clear eye to the risks, a move toward genuinely open elections throughout the Muslim world is the best strategy for incorporating Islamists safely into the social and political order.

II. ISLAMIST THREATS AND DEMOCRATIC PROMISE

Many Western analysts fear the prospect of Islamists attaining any sort of power, and their fears are not to be lightly dismissed. The Islamist threats to liberalism and Western foreign policy priorities are real; most Islamists advocate illiberal policies, and have ideas about international order that clash with those of the West (though they are not necessarily more to be feared on these points than the existing authoritarian governments). Nor is the threat to democracy, “one man, one vote, one time,” to be shrugged off. Belhadj had promised it in Algeria. Khomeini constitutionally emasculated the democratic institutions of Iran. Turabi preached democracy in the Sudan until an elected government threatened his party’s interests.

Can Islamists be trusted to surrender power if they lose an election? Perhaps, when they have a history of democratic behavior; the Turkish military has almost certainly made the right decision in trusting the AK government not to attempt a constitutional coup. But in general, democracy is a system premised on limited trust. Rather than arguing about whether to believe the moderates or radicals in a given Islamist party, democratizers should seek to establish guardian institutions with the power to deter any potential takeover, and ensure that

all parties understand that democratic rules (in particular, continuing elections with universal suffrage) are non-negotiable, whatever else is on their manifesto.

Against Kramer, I suggest that neither power nor weakness themselves have a moderating effect on extremists. The most reliable moderator is a political system which allows some participation in government (a degree of power) but in which there exist strong institutions which can guarantee continued elections and fundamental rights (a degree of weakness). Such a system should allow the possibility of a real challenge to state power (which is where overly stability-conscious strategies fail) while not falling into naivete about the motives of the challengers. The program outlined below attempts to walk that line.

A. The Threat to Democracy

Even in the Western democracies, incumbents change the rules to make their reelection more likely – one thinks of gerrymandering in the United States, or of Silvio Berlusconi’s adjustments to Italy’s criminal justice system. A good number of elected presidents and prime ministers have declared states of emergency which in practice ended the democratic regime. But, as discussed above, it is fairly rare that an ideologically anti-democratic party has won an election and used that position of power to end future elections – the “democratic paradox” *par excellence*.

To date, the states which have been taken over by Islamists (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan) have not been taken over through elections. Only in the very recent case of Turkey has an Islamist party been allowed to win a majority and form a government – and so far (educated by its iterative game of repression with the military), the AK party has attempted nothing that could be called a takeover. Elsewhere, with the glaring exception of Algeria, Islamists have rarely polled even a third of the electorate. Jillian Schwedler’s comprehensive analysis of elections in the 1990s concludes that:

The past decade of elections in the Middle East indicates that Islamist parties are not poised to take over governments through success at the polls, even assuming that less electoral engineering would increase their shares of seats.¹¹¹

Yet of course low votes alone do not guarantee continuing marginalization, and there is a meaningful prospect that during some future economic or political crisis the Islamists will win a plurality. The Nazis polled low for a decade before winning the largest bloc of votes in 1933 – which was even then barely over a third of German voters. Their electoral fortunes almost immediately began to decline, like those of the FIS in Algeria (which lost a million votes in between the 1990 local elections and the 1991 parliamentary ones). But in the German circumstances (as described above), a short window of opportunity was enough for the Nazi takeover.

In the Algerian case as well, by the 1991 elections it may have been too late to save democracy. With the FIS likely to win 70-80 percent of the seats in parliament, Belhadj and his fellow anti-democratic radicals would not have needed to compromise even with the FIS moderates, let alone the other parties. In retrospect, the cost of the Algerian civil war has been so appallingly high that one nonetheless wishes the military had allowed the Islamists to form a government, warned them of the consequences of unconstitutional behavior, and been prepared to step in if the FIS radicals crossed the line (the Turkish model). But that would have required a modicum of mutual trust; and the only possible basis for such trust would have been a pact prior to the vote that included assurances for both the military and the parties, with clearly delineated conditions for military intervention. Such a pact was never seriously attempted, because the army was skeptical of the whole experiment, and the government didn't believe that the Islamists would win a plurality.¹¹² Instead, Chadli spent his political capital on a constitution that institutionally reinforced the presidency.

The lesson of Algeria is not that elections lead to disaster; as discussed above, in several countries Islamists have won the largest bloc of votes without an ensuing breakdown

of democracy or social order. In such countries, the rules of the game have been clearly delineated beforehand, and there has existed an institution or institutions with the power to guarantee that those rules are followed. The Turkish military and the Jordanian monarch have both been plausible guarantors; Western military forces will probably perform this role in Afghanistan and Iraq (as they arguably did against the Communist parties of post-war Western Europe). By contrast, despite specious attempts to portray it as the “traditional defender of democracy in Algeria” once the crisis with the Islamists began, the Algerian army’s manifest lack of commitment to constitutional change kept it from playing such a role.¹¹³ Not without reason, it regarded the whole liberalization experiment as Chadli’s strategy to fortify the presidency against the other institutions in the former state monolith (the FLN and military). The army’s relationship with the FIS became one of mutual intimidation, with the Islamists threatening popular tribunals and the army cracking down on FIS riots with unprecedented harshness.¹¹⁴ There was no consensus on rules for gaining or dividing power, and Chadli was not strong enough to guard the newly liberalized state institutions against hardliners on both sides.

How then is it possible to transform an authoritarian regime into a democracy where ideologically anti-democratic parties can be allowed to contest elections? I propose that in many states, the key is to negotiate a pact which sets up a strong guarantor of constitutional democracy above the electoral process. In most contexts, this guarantor will be the monarch or former dictator, accepting a highly limited role as unelected head of state and guardian of the constitution. Such a guardian institution must be backed by the credible threat of force, which means that the military will still look to the guarantor rather than the elected government for direction (though the police and other law enforcement agencies will answer to the elected government). Declarations of war, peacekeeping operations, and increases or cuts in the inflation-adjusted military budget would require the joint assent of the head of

state and the elected government. However, the head of state would retain the power to unilaterally declare martial law and suspend government in certain *closely specified* conditions of threat to the constitutional order, including cancellation of elections, formal disenfranchisement of any sector of the population, a ruling party attempt to ban its competitors, a purge of secular judges, and/or the abrogation of the powers or privileges of the head of state. Offering a secure position with limited powers to a former autocrat, and tying the perpetuation of that position to the perpetuation of a free and elected government, provides a real and virtuous incentive for such autocrats to yield power.

I recognize that this military-monarchical model is hardly without risks (or moral distastefulness) of its own. Whatever democratic incentives one tries to build into the system, the fact remains that most rulers and most militaries in the Muslim world have been anything but democratic; yet this system seems to invest more trust in them than in the Islamists. The Turkish armed forces, one of the exemplars of the model, have taken “defense of the constitution” as license for brutality against the Kurds and harassment of even moderate Islamists. Clearly, a properly democratic constitution is a necessity if this model is to function properly. And ideally, the guarantor would not be a general or military figure; giving the armed forces themselves the power to decide when the constitution has been infringed can play havoc with civilian-military relations later in the democratization process.

Yet I reiterate that in this model the only robust powers of the head of state are those involving the military; all powers of taxation, appointment, legislation, domestic law enforcement, and non-military foreign policy would fall solely to the elected government. This democratic openness, I think, makes it an improvement upon all existing authoritarian models. Compared to other democratic models, this one diminishes the likelihood of an Islamist takeover at the price of leaving the system open to a military seizure of power. But it admits martial law only in the name of preserving a democratic constitution; and the cases

of Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf, the Turkish generals, and even the Algerian military *pouvoir* suggest that a coup in the name of democracy often leads back, however haltingly, to elections. An emergency regime is by its own admission the exception to constitutional rule. An Islamist regime claims to be an entirely superior form of rule.

But this comparison of worst-case scenarios should not be taken as the primary strength of the proposed model. The model grants a measure of power and security to both former autocrats and Islamists, but rather more security to the guarantor and rather more power to the Islamists; hopefully enough to keep both committed to playing politics by the rules. It can be proposed without embarrassment by Western powers to aging dictators and monarchs. It provides for emergency powers under conditions where democracy is breaking down in any case. It assumes democratic impulses in neither state nor opposition.

However, it does only protect against various sorts of coup d'état; one might suggest that there are other, less blatant ways for Islamists to effectively "end" democracy. An Islamist party finding itself temporarily in government might entrench itself by infiltrating the civil service or amending the constitution in ways that grant it ongoing influence over the state. Appointments to the bureaucracy (in particular, the ministries of education, social services, and religious affairs) can endure long after a government has lost elections.¹¹⁵ And enshrining *shari'a* as a constitutional principle potentially forecloses a whole range of future democratic legislation. Both constitutional amendments and civil service appointments are parts of a normal democratic order (unlike cancelled elections, disenfranchisement, etc.), and thus it should not be in the guarantor's power to respond to Islamist efforts of this sort with martial law; other means should be found to encourage reasonability in these areas.

On the first point, an aspect of the pact which inaugurates democracy must be agreed-upon procedures for the hiring and firing of civil servants. An inflated, ineffective state sector is one of the major problems afflicting most Muslim countries, so an ironclad

guarantee on continued civil service employment to lock out the Islamists is probably a poor strategy. Rather, citizens who believe a civil servant is refusing to follow the law for reasons of ideology or religion should be able to complain to a neutral court of arbitration. If the Islamists do a poor job in their education and social service roles (which on the evidence seems unlikely) then future elected governments can use the same rules to root out Islamists in the bureaucracy that the Islamists used to get in. Over several iterations, it is possible that the parties will begin choosing nominees moderate enough to be acceptable to their rivals.

On the second point, the essential question is what sorts of constitutional provisions are compatible with democracy. Noah Feldman (one of the few Americans for whom this is a live issue) rightly states that “there is a sense in which [the establishment of *shari‘a* as a source of law] is nothing more than a constitutional decision following from electoral politics and expressing values shared by the great majority.”¹¹⁶ The United States banned alcohol through a constitutional amendment with largely religious support; Muslim countries should be allowed to learn the lessons of Prohibition in the same way. Forbidding interest (as the Shariat Appellate Branch of the Pakistani Supreme Court did in 1999) similarly infringes no rights intrinsic to the election process, though it may destroy the basis for a modern economy.¹¹⁷ However, traditional interpretations of *shari‘a* also include limitations on the public role of women and non-Muslims, bans on apostasy and attempts at conversion, and several other questionably democratic provisions. Does the establishment of Islamic law necessarily entail a host of illiberal and even undemocratic consequences?

Revisionist legal scholar Abdullahi An-Na‘im suggests that due to its inherently plural nature, the constitutional role of *shari‘a* must be limited to general principles:

Shari‘a cannot be *legitimately* enforced by a modern state because that would require human enactment of those principles into positive laws, which would contradict the essence of religious freedom of choice among competing interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna. Shari‘a can only provide general guidance for legislation, and not the actual content of laws.¹¹⁸

An-Na‘im’s liberal view is shared in significant part by much more traditional institutions, including the Supreme Courts of many Muslim countries. The Egyptian constitution declares in Article 2 that the “principles of *shari‘a*” are the “major source of legislation” for the country. However, in a 1997 ruling on female circumcision, the Supreme Administrative Court held that in any case where one could not “derive a clear and definite provision or legal ordinance” from the Qur’an and Sunna (i.e., in any case where the *‘ulama* disagreed or the *hadith* tradition was dubious) the legislature held the right of *ijtihad*, and its decisions could not be contested pursuant to Article 2.¹¹⁹ Since the law schools and *‘ulama* held differing views on female circumcision, the legislature’s ban was allowed to stand.

On most issues, the *shari‘a* speaks with multiple voices and allows for a range of interpretations by the judge (or in a modern democracy, the legislature). On others, such as the harsh *hudud* punishments meted out for theft, sexual transgressions, and various capital crimes, the tradition sets evidentiary standards improbably high – such as the famous four witnesses to the act required for conviction for *zina* (fornication or adultery).¹²⁰ The Yemeni courts cite *hadith* principles of clemency: “Prevent the application of *hudud* whenever a doubt persists as much as you can,” and “It is better that an Imam (judging a case) should err on the side of acquittal than on the side of punishment.”¹²¹ Such standards have generally been followed in Muslim democracies; moreover, even when criminals are convicted, the judges often find excuses to commute the harshest *hudud* sentences (amputation for theft, stoning for adultery) to prison terms.¹²² In Nigeria, the notorious death sentence imposed on Amina Lawal for *zina* was overturned on technical grounds.¹²³ Only in authoritarian contexts such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan under Zia, the Sudan of Nimeiri and Bashir, and Taliban Afghanistan have *hudud* sentences been widely and enthusiastically implemented.

I suggest that only specific *shari'a* provisions that are interpreted to disenfranchise women and non-Muslims, or that limit the range of political expression and advocacy, are incompatible with democracy. These should be specifically ruled out in the initial pact between Islamists and the state. Otherwise, the institutionalization of *shari'a* should be on the table, as a democratically acceptable if highly conservative ideology. Yet here crucial questions arise: How illiberal can a state become before it destroys the civil society that is democracy's lifeblood? How much can an Islamic state restrain women (through modesty laws and economic or legal discrimination) before effectively disenfranchising them? How necessary are liberal values to the survival and thriving of democracy?

B. The Threat to Liberalism

Thus far, this thesis has implicitly separated political authoritarianism from social authoritarianism. I have followed the view that the primary virtue of a democratic state is *openness* rather than *freedom*. Democracy is not a vector heading in the direction of ever-fewer limits on one's options; it is a feedback loop, in which at any given moment citizens find themselves constrained and yet retaining some degree of control over future constraints (the paradox of self-rule). Hence democracy has room both for liberalism (a system of belief that takes individual autonomy as its primary value) and socially restrictive, communitarian, or puritanical doctrines (which hold some other value(s) prior to individual freedom).

A certain degree of procedural liberalism is inherent in democracy: after all, the fundamental democratic act is one of individual choice. But beyond the procedural freedoms of conscience, advocacy, association, and assent, a democratic order does not require a specific set of rights. Rather, democracy is the means by which citizens evaluate fundamental issues like the nature and number of rights; it should initially exclude as few opinions as possible, in the interests both of truth and of social order. This argument also presumes that the civility on which democracy rests need not emerge from a mutual

commitment to individual autonomy, but can stem from a peaceful recognition of profound differences of belief under a mutually negotiated and agreed-upon set of decision-making rules.

Liberalism remains a powerful belief system, however, with many important affinities with modernity and democracy. It quite properly defines the values that many of us bring to the democratic table. And it is far more in tension with Islamism than are the merely procedural freedoms of democracy. The concern that elected Islamists will institute illiberal policies is backed up by numerous examples:

At the municipal elections of June 1990 in Algeria, the FIS seized most of the large mayoralties: it immediately banned *rai* (a blend of traditional music and rock), had nightclubs closed, forbade the serving of alcohol, stopped subsidizing athletic activities, organized “Islamic markets” (where back-to-school supplies at the end of the school year and food products during Ramadan were available, in contrast to shortages in the official markets and the high prices on the black markets), and issued a municipal decree making “Islamic attire” (a code of modest dress) obligatory.¹²⁴

Similarly, after the recent Islamist victory in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province:

There was never any ambiguity about the ambitions of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, the religious coalition that won in the NWFP. One of its first acts in provincial government was to ban music on public transport. From those modest beginnings, it has hacked through a small forest of personal liberties: police squads tearing down cinema posters depicting actresses; raids on cinemas; videotapes and music cassettes burned; bars with permits to sell alcohol to foreigners closed down. Religious fanatics in the provincial congress compete to introduce measures to restrict women: one MP is trying to make *purdah* compulsory; another has targeted sport for women and schoolgirls.¹²⁵

Even the Islamists of Turkey began with extensive illiberal behavior. When they won power in the municipal elections of 1994, various Refah mayors banned alcohol; removed public statuary which was deemed to be idolatrous (particularly the more enthusiastic Hittite pieces from the early republic); attempted to close down the legal, well-regulated brothels of downtown Istanbul; refused licenses to certain TV stations making “immoral broadcasts” (i.e. pornography); banned a billboard showing a young woman in shorts; banned the public sale of bras and panties (as un-Islamic garb); and banned lottery tickets.¹²⁶ Many of these

measures were withdrawn in the face of popular opposition, and the AK party has opted for more subtle efforts to reintroduce religion to the public sphere; but David Shankland rightly saw Refah as a threat to “the plurality of ideas and ways of life within Turkish society.”¹²⁷

All these policies can be seen as efforts by Islamists to create what is in effect a hollow space – emptied of the extra-*shari‘a* social institutions and activities (wedding festivals, Sufi brotherhoods, music, philosophy, public roles for women and non-Muslims) which have sustained their countries and civilization for centuries. As Olivier Roy points out, ironically, this void is less likely to be filled by Islam than by Western consumer culture. “There are no Islamic leisure activities,” and while radicals may burn down cinemas, most Western entertainment media can be enjoyed in the sphere of the home, which Islamists so assiduously attempt to protect.¹²⁸ But the emptiness also has political implications: anomie and a dearth of mediating associations between individual and state, spurring violence and mistrust. Roy concludes, aptly: “Any Islamist victory will be a mirage. But the illusion it creates will not be without effects.”¹²⁹

Yet Islamism need not lead to radical puritanism and the death of civil society. Roy was specifically considering Saudi Arabia; in countries with a democratic constitutional structure, counter-forces exist to challenge the Islamist program. The efforts of the FIS and Refah provoked a backlash in opinion which affected both parties (though the intense, hostile attention of the French media to the FIS allowed it to maintain popularity on nationalist grounds).¹³⁰ Iran is a crucial example, as the society where Islamist social mores have been enforced for the longest time and with the most zeal. Though the openness of the system is limited, it is quite clear that a majority of the population cannot bear to live in the leveled social landscape that is Khomeini’s legacy, and have done their best to vote for a more liberal alternative under Khatami. The eventual social equilibrium in all these countries may still be more conservative than in the West, but it will not be empty.

As for the collapse of mediating associations, Islamist groups like Refah, the FIS, and the Egyptian Ikhwan have created social intermediaries even as they attempted to level old ones. As Jenny White has documented at length, the Turkish Islamists have tapped into extensive networks of social capital based on *imece*, a traditional principle of general reciprocity (the trust that makes community work projects possible). She refers to this as “vernacular politics,” “based on local networks of people united within a complex set of norms of mutual obligation.”¹³¹ The FIS’ urban base comprised scores of locally-based Muslim community associations, constituted by “university students, unemployed people and ex-delinquents,” who performed such tasks as regular trash collection, neighborhood clean-ups, tree planting, free tutoring for high schoolers, and the provision of child care (in the form of Qur’an school) for preschoolers.¹³² In Egypt, Carrie Wickham reports, the Islamists have built a “parallel sector” in society which has in some ways cut its members off from other social intermediaries: “The Islamic networks.... facilitated the rise of new forms of intensive, small-group solidarity that reinforced the graduates’ new Islamist commitments while simultaneously detaching them from the conventional socializing influences of family, neighbors, and peers.”¹³³ Islamists have thus included both levelers and builders of a diverse civil society; many have fostered pluralism, though a pluralism within firm boundaries.

Similarly, Islamists have been responsible for both oppression and empowerment of women in various Muslim countries. Women are often the sector of society most vulnerable to the shocks of democratization, in which old safeguards are withdrawn, state-sector jobs are dissolved, and religious conservatives rise to prominence in formerly secular states.¹³⁴ In several cases the sole claim of a dictator or monarch to be more liberal than his Islamic opposition is the fact that he supports a broader concept of women’s rights; in the short term, the advantages of new democracy for women are unlikely to outweigh the instability and repression that might follow.

Obviously, “imperfect democracy can still exist where sex equality before the law is incomplete.”¹³⁵ But democracy would be highly imperfect indeed were it to incorporate the systems of sex segregation developed to their fullest in Arabia and Afghanistan, the calls for more complete purdah in Pakistan and parts of India, or the preoccupation of Belhadj and Abassi with “*mixité* – coeducation and the mixing of men and women at work and in public places.”¹³⁶ Excessive controls on public interaction between the sexes come close to being democratically unconscionable limits on the freedoms of association and political expression. In the hypothetical situation where authoritarianism really is the only check on the oppression of half the population, even the most hardened democrat would be obliged to think twice.

Yet at the same time, many women are also attracted to Islamist movements and describe them as empowering. Female university students in Cairo and Amman are voluntarily adopting the veil; their counterparts in Istanbul would as well, if the state universities would allow it. Muslim feminist organizations in Malaysia and Morocco seek to base women’s rights on provisions in the *shari‘a*. Many appeal to the wives of the Prophet as Islamic role models; Aisha is said to legitimate women as leaders and jurisprudents, Khadijah as businesswomen and even breadwinners.¹³⁷ Female party activists were essential in the victories of Khatami in Iran and the Islamist parties in Turkey; for his part, AK leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists that he supports women working outside the home, and believes *shari‘a* is merely a “metaphor for a just society.”¹³⁸

Ideally, women should be empowered to defend (and define) their own rights. Increased education, literacy, and economic parity between sexes will be required for this to become possible; as Fish points out, on gender issues the Muslim world is particularly behind the curve.¹³⁹ The result of decades of authoritarianism is generally dismal. Perhaps, as Fish suggests, this is because the exclusion of women is itself the cause of continued dictatorship; or perhaps it is because authoritarian governments, seeking to keep their subjects

depoliticized, have every interest in maintaining the patriarchal structures that do the job for them with nearly half the population. But elections are not necessarily a fix; the countries with the greatest sex disparities include Pakistan and Bangladesh (despite their history of female heads of government), with Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Jordan, and (surprisingly) Turkey scoring only slightly better.¹⁴⁰

Overall, the relationship between regime type and gender equity is ambiguous, as is the response of women to life under an Islamist government. Recognizing the difficulties, I suggest that there exist enough other reasons for preferring democracy to overcome this ambivalent factor. In the democratic pact I envision, the voting rights of women would be one of the features specifically guaranteed by the head of state; the Kuwaiti Islamists would be obliged to accept it. As education continues to spread, one hopes that women in the Muslim world will learn to take advantage of their majority or near-majority status. Certainly the role of women in democratic politics in Iran and Turkey could point the way.

Finally, what are the consequences of an elected Islamist government likely to be for the civil rights and general welfare of non-Muslims? A few moderate Islamist groups have taken positive steps on this subject; the Nahdlatul Ulama has condemned violence against Hindus and Christians in Indonesia, and Egypt's abortive al-Wasat Party was "in favor of democratic reforms, human rights, women's rights, and the inclusion of Christians in its party project."¹⁴¹ However, most Islamists have been discriminatory or actively hostile to non-Muslim groups within their territory. Pakistani extremists have long harassed Christians under anti-proselytizing and blasphemy laws; under Ikhwan leadership, the Egyptian Doctors' Syndicate tried to prevent Coptic doctors from voting by withholding vote cards and holding elections on Good Friday.¹⁴² Heretical Muslim groups and atheists have drawn particular venom from Islamists. The Bhutto government tried to get on the Islamists' good side by amending Pakistan's Constitution to declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslims; the

Islamic Republic of Iran has mistreated its Baha'i population; the Refah Party in Turkey presided over several inadequately investigated attacks on the Alevi minority.

In 1992, atheist Faraj Fuda of Egypt was pronounced an apostate by Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, a prominent al-Azhar *alim*. Two weeks later, Fuda was murdered by an underground Islamist group; Ghazali showed no remorse.¹⁴³ Regarding Turkey, David Shankland points out the unsettling rise over the last decade in incidents of religious bullying, browbeating, violence, and even murder (of prominent secularists in 1990; journalist Uğur Mumcu in 1993; and 36 Alevis in the 1994 Sivas affair).¹⁴⁴ While he does not claim that the mainstream Islamist parties are behind this upsurge in intolerance, he believes they are unlikely to discourage it as they ought.

Democracy's great weakness is the inadequate protection of minorities; to a certain extent, "minorities in any democracy are excluded when they do not share the fundamental values of the majority."¹⁴⁵ However, a few basic guidelines should be explicitly protected by the constitutional guarantor. Religious minorities must be allowed full freedom of conscience (a principle with which orthodox Islam has no argument), as must religious dissenters and heretics (a somewhat more difficult move), and all must be given the same rights of political participation as other citizens (a move which requires a genuine reinterpretation of the *shari'a* provisions regarding the *dhimmi*).

Allowing Islamists to contest elections does pose a potentially serious threat to liberal politics in the Muslim world. But as discussed earlier, liberalism is unlikely to take root until a country begins moving toward democracy. The existing authoritarian rulers may on one or two issues be liberal enough to suit the West, but few if any are suited to instill liberal values in their subjects. Democracy, as a system with a little political liberalism built in, may be the best vector for communicating such values. It seems to have worked in Iran; hopefully it can succeed in other contexts through a less painful and extended learning process.

C. The Threat to Foreign Policy

The Islamist challenge to Western foreign interests is the most vital consideration for many scholars and analysts, yet also the one which this paper will address in the least depth. When examining democracy and liberalism, it is possible to highlight broad, general features; but Western and American interests in any given Muslim-majority country are highly specific, intricate, and contestable matters. A detailed exploration of how Islamists affect those interests in a single country could easily fill a thesis unto itself. I offer below merely a few general principles on which such evaluations might be made.

In the preceding sections, I have tried to establish that the dynamic stability offered by democracy-with-guarantees is both possible and preferable to simple authoritarian stability. I have also highlighted a handful of circumstances in which elections are particularly risky or of questionable value. For example, it has been suggested that certain Muslim countries might be too brittle or too vital to risk their destabilization through elections. Between massive petroleum wealth, a strategic location, and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia is a high-stakes client state; and the combination of declining incomes, a population steeped in Wahhabi ideology, and an armed Islamist opposition capable of battling the government in the streets of Riyadh make it particularly unstable as well. Pakistan is currently vital to the U.S. war on terror, and its nuclear capability makes the prospect of Islamists coming to power a particularly unhappy one – at least while the *jihad* in Kashmir continues.

However, if democracy is indeed the best general context in which to moderate Islamist groups, countries like these will be seen as unfortunate exceptions to the rule, worth further scrutiny to see what steps will make democracy possible. If indeed Saudi Arabia is currently too fragile to support elections (and it may not be), America should take what steps it can to remedy that situation: perhaps by relocating troops, redoubling support for

democracy in neighboring Gulf states, or encouraging the Saudi monarchy to resume a controlled, constitutional reform process. In Pakistan, the West might be able to take certain steps to decrease the unprecedented, surging popularity of Pakistan's Islamists, or to assume a more active role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. Regardless, there should no longer be any room for complacency about the "strength" or "stability" of the current Saudi and Pakistani regimes – two classic cases of weak autocrats buying support by appealing to violent Islamist groups. In both cases, free elections should be held with great caution, and perhaps take place only after measures to reverse the entrenchment of Islamists in state bodies; but the West should by all means attempt to figure out a road map to get to those elections.

In making these evaluations, it is crucially important to differentiate between illiberal groups, undemocratic groups, and groups merely opposed to Western foreign policy priorities. For example, the refusal to make peace with Israel on terms perceived (rightly or wrongly) to be unfair is not an inherently illiberal position, though it contradicts a pillar of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Still less is it undemocratic. Critics of democracy are right to fear that elections in the Middle East would (at least in the short term, and very possibly the long term) threaten the Arab-Israeli peace process. After all, elections brought Binyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon to power in Israel. The "moderation" that can be expected to stem from participation in democracy is generally a move toward democratic or liberal habits – not toward support of a foreign government's policy priorities. At the same time, Feldman argues (I think correctly) that

Real normalization cannot occur unless ordinary Arabs take responsibility for the choice to make peace and accept the permanency and legitimacy of Israel's existence – and that will never happen so long as Arab leaders remain autocrats who do not speak or act for their people.¹⁴⁶

Democracy is a precondition for lasting peace; the question (which I must leave unanswered) is whether the first peace agreements must precede democracy, or vice versa.

Everywhere, democracy poses a risk to certain foreign policy interests. It is easier for a Western power to buy a dictator (whose continued rule rests in part on external rents and resources) than to convince a majority of the population (or their representatives) to support the Western or American line. The difficulty of buying a democracy was recently displayed in Turkey, with its last-minute denial of a northern front for the U.S. war in Iraq. The question is whether the West wants partner countries, cooperating out of shared interests, or client countries, cooperating because their ruling class depends on foreign funding. It takes a greater effort to convince people of shared interests, but if they are so convinced, they will cooperate reliably. In Egypt, by contrast, “American aid of \$2 billion a year since Camp David has bought shockingly little good will” or support for U.S. policies.¹⁴⁷

Needless to say, in a host of cases Western and American foreign policy is worth reconsidering; the Islamist “threat” can and should be a challenge to reevaluate our priorities. Western nations have often backed weak but long-lived states in the Muslim world, states which were able to repress their own populations but not to redress their abiding problems. Those dissatisfied and oppressed populations no longer remain within the boundaries of their homelands. America in particular has overlooked the tendencies of friendly tyrants to foster violent Islamist groups. In the new context of the war on terror, the U.S. should be careful not to make the opposite error and assume that all Islamist governments are ideologically predestined to succour terrorists. Libya (if Muammar al-Qaddafi is allowed to count as a rather bizarre Islamist) and the Sudan demonstrate that even Islamic states that once supported terror can be convinced or coerced into changing their priorities.

America should also not fall into the error of thinking that a muscular foreign policy is any replacement for a smart and publicly defensible foreign policy. To return one last time

to analogies with European extremism: Mussolini's aggressiveness was in part inspired by a perception of weakness on the parts of the other Western powers. "In both the Ethiopian and Spanish crises he took close note of the half-hearted and vacillating Anglo-French policies" of backing down in the face of fascist belligerence.¹⁴⁸ Mussolini considered the robust ideology of fascism to be an inevitable victor over the dying, decadent powers in London and Paris. Remarkably similar statements have issued from various Islamists over the last few years – specifically Osama bin Laden. They have been met with assertions of U.S. strength.

Yet the United States should not allow bin Laden's taunts to draw it into shows of decisive but unnecessary force which will turn the Muslim world against it. Mussolini and Hitler set out to conquer the world by military force, and were stopped by military force. But the other great ideological war of the twentieth century was not concluded on a battlefield – it was won (if historian John Gaddis is correct) in the hearts and minds of Western Europeans over the first decade of the Cold War.¹⁴⁹ Where the U.S.S.R. formed an alliance based fundamentally on coercion (confirmed by the appalling plunder and rapine committed by the Red Army in Eastern Europe after the war), the U.S.A. formed an alliance based fundamentally on consent – or at any rate, with far more room for allied dissent – and generous amounts of reconstruction aid through the Marshall Plan.

Neither side won hearts, minds, or serious advantage in the long series of Third World proxy wars that followed (where the U.S.A. generally sought clients rather than allies). The war currently underway is a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people of the Third World; and they do not see the recent extension of the United States' reach as an alliance of consent, but as unjustified bullying. The United States is associated with al-Jazeera images of casualties in Baghdad. Successful economic and democratic reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan is essential if this image is to be reversed.

Meanwhile, recent elections in Pakistan, Morocco, Kuwait, and Jordan have all shown a strengthened Islamist tendency. The first elections in Iraq, if free and fair, will almost certainly return a large number (if not a majority) of mullahs as parliamentarians, both as a protest against the United States and because at the local level, more people know and trust their cleric than their new-minted politicians.¹⁵⁰ In the months and years to come, the United States will be repeatedly called on to decide how far it is willing to trust Islamists, and (in areas under U.S. influence) how much participation it will allow them. In general, the U.S. response should be to create or encourage institutions that will allow participation without requiring over-much trust: that is, a negotiated democracy.

Conclusion

What can the United States and other Western powers do to foster democratic pacts in the countries of the Muslim world? There is a powerful irony in proposing that the richest and most powerful countries on the planet dictate to other states the means by which they are to create free, open-ended, and participatory political systems. Some would argue that the model of democracy as a means for peaceful, moderate social change aims at diluting popular pressures for genuinely representative government.

Steve Niva, for example, suggests that the search for Islamists who are willing to play by democratic rules is motivated by a desire for “controlled liberalization limited to elections among competing elites – ‘low-intensity democracy’... to relieve the pressures that accompany neo-liberal restructuring and IMF-imposed ‘reforms’ while pre-empting challenges from subordinate classes and groups demanding fundamental changes and a larger role in the political system.”¹⁵¹ He compares the current policy debate to the old colonial argument over “whether to subjugate non-Western natives militarily or to ‘civilize’ them culturally in order to preserve Western hegemony.... Both policy options still aim to subjugate the Middle East according to Western rather than indigenous popular interests.”¹⁵²

I have tried to avoid proposing such a program. This thesis does not advocate “low-intensity democracy”; I emphasize again that general openness to any group (not just a specific set of elites) and genuine power-sharing are essential factors in the moderation of extremist groups through democracy. The only doors closed to the Islamists are violent revolution and any measures that would close off the possibility of future democratic change. The system would be open to the participation of “subordinate classes and groups demanding fundamental changes” – though experience suggests that democracy is a poor means for carrying out fundamental changes. In a functioning democratic order, the mistakes inherent in plans of sweeping systemic transformation quickly become apparent, as the groups and individuals who would suffer from that change protest and negotiate a more reasonable adjustment. I take this to be an advantage.

Nor do I propose that the West should itself be responsible for designing and imposing democratic institutions – save in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where an unelected local figure (perhaps a Chief Justice) implicitly backed by Western military force could perform the role of guarantor. Elsewhere, Western governments (and the United States in particular) must recognize their partial responsibility for the form of regime they help sustain in their client states; though of course they generally do not have the power to change that regime. Western governments can, however, take seriously the possibility of pacted democracy in these countries, proposing it to government and Islamists alike; provide additional guarantees (financial or military) to pacts that do occur between government and opposition; and expand the range of favorable diplomatic and economic incentives they provide to fellow democracies.

Encouragement of democracy is inevitably of limited direct effectiveness. But the perception that the West is honestly pressuring authoritarian governments to change will contribute greatly to winning over Muslims – even Islamists – to the cause of democracy.

Endnotes

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- ¹ See Mohsen Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Khosrow Fatemi, "Leadership by Distrust: The Shah's Modus Operandi," *Middle East Journal* vol. 36 no. 1 (Winter 1982).
- ² See Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
- ³ Ricardo Rene Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000), pp. 166-68.
- ⁴ As in the 'affaire du foulard' that began in 1989, when Muslim immigrants fought for the right to send their daughters to school veiled. See Gilles Kepel, *Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 152, 184ff.
- ⁵ Michael Willis, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 199.
- ⁶ Willis, pp. 144-45, 199; Laremont, pp. 206-07.
- ⁷ François Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamist Movement in North Africa* (Austin: Center For Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas Press, 1993), pp. 291-92, 298; Willis, pp. 184-85, 246.
- ⁸ See Aziz al-Azmeh, "Populism Contra Democracy: recent democratist discourse in the Arab world," in *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, ed. Ghassan Salamé (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994)
- ⁹ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).
- ¹⁰ Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 41.
- ¹¹ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 215-16.
- ¹² See Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- ¹³ Like most procedural definitions of democracy, this one owes a conceptual debt to Robert Dahl. See for example *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 10-11.
- ¹⁴ Adam Przeworski and his colleagues identify various socioeconomic levels at which democracy has historically been more or less likely to succeed, but explicitly deny that the record justifies "supporting or even condoning dictatorships" in poor countries where the dictatorships are under challenge. See Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 79-98, 178.
- ¹⁵ See the Human Development Index in *UNDP Human Development Report 2003*, available online at <http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/>.
- ¹⁶ Snyder, pp. 27-31 and *passim*.
- ¹⁷ Several of the essays in *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, ed. Ghassan Salamé (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994) discuss the applicability of models of pacted transition to the Arab world – see particularly Salamé's introduction and the essays by John Waterbury and Jean Leca. All draw to some extent on the pact model as refined and laid out by Przeworski in *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- ¹⁸ John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats? The potential for political liberalization in the Middle East," in *Democracy Without Democrats?* ed. Ghassan Salamé (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 40.
- ¹⁹ Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), pp. 60-61.
- ²⁰ See Eberhard Kolb, *The Weimar Republic* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), trans. P.S. Falla, pp. 120-25. A helpful table of results in every Weimar election can be found on pp. 194-95.
- ²¹ On which see Pavel Tigrid, "The Prague Coup of 1948: The Elegant Takeover," in *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, ed. Thomas T. Hammond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
- ²² Alan Cassels, *Fascist Italy*, 2nd ed. (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1985), p. 33.
- ²³ Cassels 1985, pp. 43-44.
- ²⁴ Cassels 1985, p. 47.
- ²⁵ Berman, p. 425,

- ²⁶ Cassels 1985, p. 35.
- ²⁷ Burgat and Dowell, p. 257. This was also, famously, the category from which the majority of the 9-11 hijackers were drawn. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham describes Egypt's unemployed "lumpen intelligentsia" in *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), ch. 3. R. Stephen Humphreys likewise opens his book with vivid stories of underemployed Cairene intellectuals; see *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 1-4.
- ²⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: the Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 84.
- ²⁹ Cassels 1985, p. 35; Kolb, p. 190.
- ³⁰ Nasr, pp. 13-14.
- ³¹ John Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 4th ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998), p. 157.
- ³² See Gokhan Cetinsaya, "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' in Modern Turkish Political Thought," *The Muslim World* Vol. 89, No. 3-4 (July-October 1999), and Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
- ³³ On the *partito armato*, see Michael Ledeen, *West European Communism and American Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 31-41; on its Egyptian equivalent, see Gudrun Krämer, "The Integration of the Integrists: A comparative study of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia," in *Democracy Without Democrats?* ed. Ghassan Salamé (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 211.
- ³⁴ See Thomas T. Hammond, ed., *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 639; J. Hafvenstein, *Democracy in Nepal* (unpublished, 1998).
- ³⁵ Kolb, p. 182.
- ³⁶ Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969), pp. 287-88. See also Berman, p. 424, fn. 65.
- ³⁷ Hammond, pp 639-40.
- ³⁸ Waterbury, p. 40.
- ³⁹ Leonard Weinberg, *The Transformation of Italian Communism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), p. 39.
- ⁴⁰ Weinberg, pp. 34-35, 37.
- ⁴¹ Ronald Tiersky, "French Communism, Eurocommunism, and Soviet Power," in *Eurocommunism and Détente*, ed. Rudolph Tökes (New York: New York University Press, 1978).
- ⁴² See Vassilis Fouskas, *Italy, Europe, the Left: The transformation of Italian communism and the European imperative* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998). See also Norman Kogan, "The Italian Communist Party: The Modern Prince at the Crossroads," in *Eurocommunism and Détente*, ed. Rudolph Tökes (New York: New York University Press, 1978).
- ⁴³ Ledeen, pp. 75, 76.
- ⁴⁴ Weinberg, p. 78.
- ⁴⁵ Weinberg, p. 46.
- ⁴⁶ Weinberg, p. 38.
- ⁴⁷ Though the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union played a major role in the final metamorphosis of the PCI into the PDS (a factor emphasized in particular by Weinberg), Vassilis Fouskas suggests that the 1980s simply brought the Soviet Union into line with what the Eurocommunists had been arguing all along. Fouskas also argues (with some plausibility) that the transformation was irreversibly underway in any case, as the forces of increasing European integration strengthened Occhetto and the other reformist PCI leaders against the anti-capitalist wing of the party. See Fouskas, *passim*.
- ⁴⁸ Weinberg, p. 100.
- ⁴⁹ The most thorough and insightful analysis of Refah's "vernacular politics" is Jenny White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).
- ⁵⁰ See M. Hakan Yavuz, "The Politics of Fear: The Rise of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* vol 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002) and also White, pp. 148ff.
- ⁵¹ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Place of Tolerance in Islam*, eds. Joshua Cohen and Ian Lague (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), pp. 6-7.
- ⁵² M. Steven Fish, "Islam and Authoritarianism," *World Politics* 55 (October 2002), 4-37. Przeworski et al. (2000) find no meaningful correlation between Islam and authoritarianism, but the difference may stem

from the fact that (1) their data set excludes the Gulf states, and (2) Fish uses Freedom House and Polity Project ratings as metrics for democracy, while Przeworski et al. use a rather more demanding measure of alternation in government (thus reducing the number of “democracies” elsewhere in the world). However, the Przeworski et al. study is based on a longer time scale and far more data, and certainly merits serious consideration.

⁵³ Mansoor Moaddel’s *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria* (New York: Palgrave, 2002) explores the connection between “immanent ideological” secular states and violent Islamist reactions. See Moaddel, p. 5, passim. Needless to say, in none of the listed states has secularism had the slightest connection to democracy.

⁵⁴ See Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Erik Zürcher’s *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998). In Tunisia, decades of state secularism have provoked a powerful but hitherto mostly non-violent Islamist rejoinder; it might thus be accounted a partial success. However, unlike the Islamist parties in Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco, Rashid al-Ghannushi’s An-Nahda has never held even partial state power; its moderation has not yet been tested.

⁵⁵ See José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

⁵⁶ Fish, p. 23.

⁵⁷ Casanova, p. 215. Alone among world religions, Catholicism was found to have a positive correlation with democracy in the data analysis of Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (1999).

⁵⁸ Major contemporary articulations of a civil pluralist Islam by Muslim thinkers include the writings of Abdol Karim Soroush and Mohammed Shahrour, Mohammed Arkoun’s *The Qur’an and the Book*, Khaled Abou El Fadl’s *The Place of Tolerance in Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), and Abdullahi An-Na’im’s *Toward an Islamic Reformation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990). See also Charles Kurzman’s anthology *Liberal Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁵⁹ See Joshua A. Stacher, “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party,” *Middle East Journal* vol. 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002).

⁶⁰ See Hefner 2000, p. .

⁶¹ John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, “Islam’s Democratic Essence,” *Middle East Quarterly* vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1994) (available online at <http://www.meforum.org/article/151>).

⁶² Azmeh, p. 126.

⁶³ While Turabi’s orchestration of the 1989 military coup cannot be proved, Abdel Salam Sidahmed argues convincingly that the NIF pledged its support to the Bashir government too readily and too early for its denial of involvement in the coup to be plausible. In the years following the coup, Turabi conceived and implemented numerous laws that were both illiberal and anti-democratic. See Sidahmed, *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 189-91; and Ann Mosely Lesch, “The Destruction of Civil Society in the Sudan,” in *Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. II*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 158, 160-61.

⁶⁴ The statistical analyses I have reviewed do not take this sufficiently into account. Fish’s dummy variable for OPEC membership (strongly correlated with authoritarianism) leaves out many rentier states which also have a long history of successful dictatorship (Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Egypt); see Fish, pp. 10-13.

Przeworski et al. choose to omit the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states from most of their analyses precisely because rentierism so distorts the relationship between democracy and economic policy which is their main area of interest; see p. 79.

⁶⁵ R. Stephen Humphreys discusses the commodity monoculture “trap” in post-colonial economies; see Humphreys, pp. 15-21.

⁶⁶ The mechanics of the rentier “petro-state” are worked out in Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” *World Politics* vol. 53 (April 2001), and in the many works of Giacomo Luciani.

⁶⁷ Though not the only one, of course. Nazih Ayubi suggests that many of the features of the Arab state can be explained by the retention of a control-based “tributary” mode of production from previous tribal and caliphal social orders. See *Over-Stating the Arab State* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 53-58.

Rentierism, however, is a sufficient explanation for much of the strength and durability of Arab dictators.

⁶⁸ See Ghanim Alnajjar, “The Challenges Facing Kuwaiti Democracy,” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000).

⁶⁹ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Islamic Activism and Political Opposition in Egypt” (1995) in *Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays* (Cairo: The American University In Cairo Press, 1996), p. 58.

⁷⁰ Martin Kramer, "The Mismeasure of Political Islam," in *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1997), p. 168.

⁷¹ Michael Hudson, "Arab Regimes and Democratization: Responses to the Challenges of Political Islam," in *The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World*, ed. Laura Guazzone (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1995), p. 224.

⁷² Ayubi 1995, p. 3.

⁷³ I find less convincing various other factors that have been used to explain the legitimacy crisis of the Arab state. The post-colonial legacy – borders and government institutions with no roots in the region's historical experience – may have been the origin of the problem, but elsewhere in the post-colonial Muslim world (Senegal, Malaysia) effective governments have won legitimacy despite these origins. Daniel Pipes has attributed the depoliticization and dearth of legitimacy in the Arab world to religion, specifically the fundamental inability of any state to live up to Islamic ideals by implementing *shari'a*. See Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 59-63; see also Yahya Sadowski, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate," *Middle East Report* 183, vol. 23 no. 4 (July-August 1993). But the Islamists haven't been the only group to challenge the legitimacy of the state, and at mid-century nationalist Arab regimes enjoyed mass support notwithstanding their secularism. I find much more convincing the connection of low legitimacy with the persistent failure of Arab states to provide economic stability and justice, thanks to rentierism, an expensive arms race, poor economic policy-making, and the inflation of a non-productive state sector; see Humphreys, pp. 10-22.

⁷⁴ Humphreys, 17-20.

⁷⁵ Laremont, pp. 166-68.

⁷⁶ Stacher, p. 422; see also Augustus Richard Norton, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of Egypt's Hizb al-Wasat" (unpublished).

⁷⁷ See Phillippe Fargues, "Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval?" in *Democracy Without Democrats?* ed. Ghassan Salamé (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994).

⁷⁸ Juan Linz, "Opposition In and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in *Regimes and Oppositions*, ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 174.

⁷⁹ Throughout the Muslim world, states have also used massive violence in response to secessionist movements – the Pakistani government against the Baluch, the Iraqi against the Kurds, the Sudanese against the southerners, the Indonesian against the Timorese, Acehnese, and Papuans. The problems of secessionism and irredentism are rather different from those raised by ideological extremists, and are thus out of the scope of this paper.

⁸⁰ Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon, "Domestic and International Evolution of the Spanish Communist Party," in *Eurocommunism and Détente*, ed. Rudolph Tökes (New York: New York University Press, 1978), p. 206.

⁸¹ See Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), pp. 53-62.

⁸² Mansour Khalid, *The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in Sudan's Political Evolution* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), p. 310.

⁸³ Sidahmed, p. 211.

⁸⁴ Had there not been a special 28-seat constituency for university graduates (of which the NIF won 24), the NIF would have won only 27 seats – fewer than the loose coalition of southern parties, which together won 33 seats. See Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 111.

⁸⁵ Nasr, pp. 192-203.

⁸⁶ Hefner, pp. 92-93.

⁸⁷ Ayubi 1991, p. 86.

⁸⁸ Marsha Pripstein-Posusney. "Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World." *Middle East Report* 209, vol. 28 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 13.

⁸⁹ Ghassan Salamé, "Small is Pluralistic: Democracy as an Instrument of Civil Peace," in *Democracy Without Democrats?* ed. Ghassan Salamé (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 107. Kuwait's rentier economy, however, means its amirs have more internal power than do the kings of Jordan or the presidents of Lebanon.

⁹⁰ See Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000).

- ⁹¹ Glenn Robinson, "Can Islamists be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 51, no. 3 (Summer) p. 381.
- ⁹² Wiktorowicz, pp. 30-35
- ⁹³ Robert Mortimer, "Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), p. 588.
- ⁹⁴ Willis, pp. 172-73.
- ⁹⁵ Laremont, p. 201.
- ⁹⁶ Gudrun Krämer, "Good Counsel to the King: The Islamist Opposition in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco," in *Middle East Monarchies*, ed. Joseph Kostiner (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), p. 270.
- ⁹⁷ Moaddel, pp. 113-114.
- ⁹⁸ Abdeslam Maghraoui, "Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's Morocco," *Middle East Report* 218, vol. 31 no. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 15.
- ⁹⁹ Hugh Roberts, "Algeria's Contested Elections," *Middle East Report* 209, vol. 28 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 23.
- ¹⁰⁰ Vickie Langohr, "Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship Between Islamisms and Electoral Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (November 2001), 594.
- ¹⁰¹ See Nathan J. Brown, *The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf* (Cambridge: 1997, Cambridge University Press), pp. 51-52, 92, 125.
- ¹⁰² François Burgat, *Face to Face With Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 96.
- ¹⁰³ Hala Mustafa, "The Islamist Movements Under Mubarak," in *The Islamist Dilemma*, ed. Laura Guazzone (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1995), p. 170.
- ¹⁰⁴ Linz 1973, p. 183.
- ¹⁰⁵ Moaddel, p. 127.
- ¹⁰⁶ Moaddel, pp. 93, 136-38.
- ¹⁰⁷ On the Ikhwan's failure to reform the professional syndicates of Egypt, see Ninette S. Fahmy, "The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform?" *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998). On the shortcomings of Refah local government in Turkey, see Ugur Akinci, "The Welfare Party's Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* vol. 53, no. 1 (Winter 1999).
- ¹⁰⁸ For a history of the Iranian attempt to realize the *shari'a* concretely, see Milani, ch. 10, 11. For a critical analysis, see Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, tr. Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), ch. 10.
- ¹⁰⁹ Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey," in *Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. II*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 29.
- ¹¹⁰ Zakaria, p. 149.
- ¹¹¹ Jillian Schwedler, "A Paradox of Democracy? Islamist Participation in Elections," *Middle East Report* 209, vol. 28 no. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 28.
- ¹¹² Laremont, p. 223.
- ¹¹³ Burgat and Dowell, p. 291.
- ¹¹⁴ Willis, pp. 246, 184-85; Burgat and Dowell, pp. 269-70, 291-92.
- ¹¹⁵ Langohr, p. 594.
- ¹¹⁶ Noah Feldman, *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003), p. 55. Feldman is currently [August 2003] engaged in drafting a constitution for Iraq.
- ¹¹⁷ Michael Lau, "The Islamization of Laws in Pakistan: Impact on the Independence of the Judiciary," in *The Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World*, eds. Eugene Cotran and Mai Yamani (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 163.
- ¹¹⁸ Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, "Political Islam in National Politics and International Relations," in *The Desecularization of the World*, ed. Peter Berger (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 117.
- ¹¹⁹ Kilian Bälz, "Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and the Construction of Tradition: The Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court and Female Circumcision (Appeal no. 5257/43, 28 December 1997)," in *The Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World: Human Rights and the Judicial Process*, eds. Eugene Cotran and Mai Yamani (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 39.
- ¹²⁰ However, in practice pregnancy is often taken as sufficient evidence for a woman's conviction, and in some cases both partners plead guilty.

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- ¹²¹ Najeeb Shamiry, "The Rule of Law in Yemen: Uniting North and South," in *The Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World: Human Rights and the Judicial Process*, eds. Eugene Cotran and Mai Yamani (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 116.
- ¹²² Shamiry, pp. 118-19.
- ¹²³ O. Carl Unegbu, "Nigeria: Bellwether of African Democracy," *World Policy Journal* vol. 20, no. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 44.
- ¹²⁴ Roy, p. 81.
- ¹²⁵ Isabel Hilton, "Pakistan is losing the fight against fundamentalism," *The Guardian*, May 29, 2003.
- ¹²⁶ Akinci, pp. 85-87.
- ¹²⁷ David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Modern Turkey* (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 108.
- ¹²⁸ Roy, p. 196.
- ¹²⁹ Roy, p. 195.
- ¹³⁰ Burgat and Dowell, p. 282.
- ¹³¹ White, pp. 20-21.
- ¹³² Rabia Bekkar, "Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria," *Middle East Report* 179, vol. 22 no. 6 (November-December 1992), p. 13
- ¹³³ Wickham, p. 163.
- ¹³⁴ Laurie Brand, *Women, the State, and Political Liberalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), Introduction. Brand opens her book with a comparison of the Middle East to Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism.
- ¹³⁵ Feldman, p. 65.
- ¹³⁶ Arun Kapil, "Algeria's Elections Show Islamist Strength," *Middle East Report* 166, vol. 20 no. 5 (September-October 1990), p. 36.
- ¹³⁷ Mai Yamani, "Muslim Women and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia: Aspirations of a New Generation," in *The Rule of Law in the Middle East and the Islamic World: Human Rights and the Judicial Process*, eds. Eugene Cotran and Mai Yamani (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), pp. 139-141.
- ¹³⁸ White, p. 139.
- ¹³⁹ Fish, p. 25.
- ¹⁴⁰ Fish, pp. 33-34.
- ¹⁴¹ Stacher, p. 416.
- ¹⁴² Fahmy, p. 560.
- ¹⁴³ Steven Barraclough, "Al-Azhar: Between the Government and the Islamists," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998), p. 241.
- ¹⁴⁴ Shankland, pp. 116-17.
- ¹⁴⁵ Feldman, p. 59.
- ¹⁴⁶ Feldman, p. 14.
- ¹⁴⁷ Feldman, p. 171.
- ¹⁴⁸ Cassels 1985, p. 93.
- ¹⁴⁹ John Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
- ¹⁵⁰ I owe this idea to Houchang Chehabi's description of a similar process in the first post-revolutionary elections in Iran.
- ¹⁵¹ Steve Niva, "Between Clash and Co-optation: US Foreign Policy and the Specter of Islam," *Middle East Report* 208, vol. 28 no. 3 (Fall 1998), p. 28.
- ¹⁵² Niva, p. 29.

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